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This thesis illustrates why India should play a more important role in U.S.
strategic planning and policy making by demonstrating that India is an established
regional power with innate aspirations of becoming a great power. This is
accomplished by forecasting India's global role in the twenty-first century using
a historical analysis of modern Indian history, and augmented by an indepth
analysis of three key indicators of India's great power potential: the issue of
Kashmir, the Indian Navy, and the Indian Economy. The thesis recommends that
the United States acknowledge that India is approaching the threshold of true great
power status and plan accordingly.
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India has been identified as a potential great power in
the twenty- first century. India's strategic location, immense
population, vast untapped resources, growing military power,
and expanding economy warrant more attention in U.S. strategic
circles, yet it remains only a peripheral concern to the
United States. This thesis argues that India will play a more
important role in the post-Cold War world, therefore, the
United States should elevate the priority of India in its
foreign policy hierarchy.
A forecast of India's role in the international political
structure of the twenty- first century will be accomplished
through an analysis of the events, policies, and personalities
that have shaped India's great power potential from
independence in 1947 to the present day. This analysis will
be conducted chronologically and focus on four time frames:
1947-1962: Nehru and nation building
1962-1971: The clash of realpolitik and idealism
1971-1990: Regional hegemony and the Cold War
1990-1994: Beyond socialism and the Soviet Union.
This chronological analysis will be augmented by an indepth
analysis of three key indicators of India's great power
potential: the issue of Kashmir, the Indian Navy, and the
Indian economy.
The thesis concludes by recognizing that India is an
established regional power with the potential to become a
xi
great power during the first half of the twenty- first century.
In addition to this hypothesis, six general assertions are
deduced from the body of the thesis:
1. India has and will maintain intrinsic great power
aspirations
.
2. For the time being, India will remain a peripheral concern
for U.S. foreign policy. India continues to be considered
half as important as China, receiving minimal attention in
U.S. strategic circles even though it is an established
regional power and a potential great power.
3. India's economic reforms will continue but New Delhi's
successes will be overshadowed by the rapid growth of other,
more dynamic Asian economies (i.e. China, Taiwan, Thailand,
and South Korea)
.
4. The Indian Navy will continue to be the Indian Ocean's
dominant indigenous maritime power well into the foreseeable
future. Its formidable power projection capabilities are
likely to grow in proportion to the Indian economy (i.e. the
percentage of India's defense spending will remain relatively
constant )
.
5. The issue of Kashmir will continue to be a political
albatross for New Delhi in the twenty- first century. Tensions
between India and Pakistan over this disputed territory will
hamper economic cooperation and growth throughout South Asia.
6. India's central government and democratic institutions
will continue to be tested by communal violence and ethno-
religious conflicts but will survive.
Sooner or later the United States will have to
acknowledge the growing international status of India. A
highly visible, pragmatic, and co-operative U.S. approach
toward India now would be the most cost effective means to
pursue the current U.S. national interests -- regional
stability, an expansion of economic trade, and the reduction
and elimination of WMD -- in South Asia in the future.
XII
In addition to the current U.S. national interests with
regard to South Asia, a healthy, enduring bilateral
relationship with India could also serve as a continental and
maritime Asian counter-balance against a potentially





Technology and trade have made the world smaller and more
interdependent. In the wake of the Cold War, regional
political events will have a greater impact on U.S. domestic
and foreign policies. The uncertainty of today's international
political environment necessitates a reevaluation of U.S.
national interests and security strategies. This reevaluation
should concentrate on those regions and countries which will
have the greatest impact on the long-term security and
economic well being of the United States.
India has been identified as a 'potential great power in
the twenty- first century. In his final book, Beyond Peace
,
Richard Nixon warned that:
The stakes are enormous. We [the United
States] have a profound interest in India's
success in implementing free-market economic
reforms. . .it [India] will become a great
power by the next century if it continues down
the road toward free-market economics. 1
India's strategic location, immense population, vast untapped
resources, growing military power, and expanding economy
warrant more attention in U.S. strategic circles. Yet for
most Americans, "India is half as important as China and gets
one tenth the attention." 2 When our attention is drawn to
Richard M. Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House,
1994) 158-165.
: Emily MacFarquhar, "America and the un-China, " U.S . News and
World Report 2 3 May 19 94: 49.
India it is usually due to some unfortunate circumstance or
for controversial issues such as: nuclear proliferation, human
rights violations, unfair labor practices, overpopulation, and
most recently, outbreaks of pneumonic and bubonic plague.
America's benign apathy towards India resulted from the
policies and practices of the Cold War. The "with us or
against us" mentality of the U.S. anti- communist crusade
pushed India closer to the Soviet Union and caused a half-
century of uneven, estranged Indo-American relations. 3
While the end of the Cold War presents many challenges
for U.S. policy makers, it also offers new opportunities for
dealing with South Asia. The -United States has the
opportunity to expunge Indo-American relations of
misunderstandings and misconceptions that arose from Cold War
politics. A strong, healthy relationship flowing from the
convergence of U.S. and Indian national interests (i.e. free
market economic growth, the survival of multi- cultural
democracy, and a relaxation of tensions in South Asia) could
lead to lasting peace and prosperity in the region.
The goal of this thesis is to explain why South Asia
should be an integral component of post Cold War U.S.
strategic thinking and planning. This is to be accomplished
by demonstrating what kind of global power India is likely to
become. A worthwhile prediction of India's future must be
Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged
Democracies (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1992) 447.
based on a solid understanding of the major developments of
the latter half of the twentieth century.
A forecast of India's role in the international political
structure of the twenty- first century will be made through an
analysis of the events, policies, and personalities that have
shaped India's great power potential from independence in 1947
to the present day. This analysis will be conducted
chronologically and focus on four time frames:
1947-1962: Nehru and nation building
1962-1971: The clash of realpolitik and idealism
1971-1990: Regional hegemony and the Cold War
1990-1994: Beyond socialism and the Soviet Union
India's recognized nuclear capability, large standing
army, vast pool of highly skilled labor, and enormous
population are worthy of more attention in U.S. strategic
circles than smaller nations lacking these attributes. On
the flip side, however, India's inefficient bureaucracy, high
level of poverty, and myriad of violent ethno- religious
conflicts are not the marks of a great power. This historical
analysis will highlight key determinants that support India's
claim to great power status and also explain the primary
factors obstructing New Delhi's efforts to play a greater role
in world events.
Two indicators of great power status are economic
capacity and naval strength. As Captain Mahan predicted:
Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates
Asia. This Ocean is the key to the Seven
Seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the
world will be decided on its waters. 4
Because economic vitality and naval might will continue to be
high priorities for tomorrow's world powers, this thesis will
also evaluate India's economic and naval power potential.
A section of this thesis will also be devoted to the
historical and contemporary sources of India's ongoing
Kashmiri imbroglio. Many of modern India's domestic,
regional, and international difficulties are a result of the
long standing feud between New Delhi and Islamabad over
Kashmir. A peaceful resolution of this conflict could
stabilize relations in the region and lessen domestic tensions
throughout South Asia, thus, accelerating India's drive toward
great power status. If the belligerent rhetoric and saber
rattling between India and Pakistan were to intensify,
however, the ensuing economic and political erosion could lead
to a fourth war, possibly with nuclear consequences.
A concise analysis of India's modern history, keying on
the forces that have and will shape India's future world role,
combined with an indepth examination of the Indian Navy,
economy, and the Kashmir conflict will provide valuable
insights as to the future of India's strategic role in the
post-Cold War world.
Alfred T. Mahan as quoted in Monoranjan Bezboruah, U.S
Strategy in the Indian Ocean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977
3 .
The proceeding chapters will also demonstrate that India
believes its "tryst with destiny" is to become one of the
world's great nations. India has been the dominant regional
power in South Asia for over two decades. If India's economy
takes off and sustains consistent high rates of growth like so
many of its Asian neighbors, New Delhi will emerge as a major
powerhouse in the Asia- Pacific region by the middle of the
twenty- first century.
Future global economic development and growth will
inevitably make the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent of Asia
even more vital to world commerce and trade. Today as India
approaches the threshold of great power status, however, the
United States continues to overlook the economic potential and
strategic importance of this region.

II. 1947-19 62: NEHRU AND NATION BUILDING
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, initiated
India's great power aspirations. Nehru felt that because of
its ancient history, immense population, economic potential,
geographic location, and sheer size, India was destined to be
an influential player on the world stage. While non-
alignment and its corollary, panchsheel (peaceful
coexistence) , were designed to give India the political
freedom it needed to build a strong, secure state, the 1962
war with China demonstrated the vulnerability of the embryonic
republic to external military threats. Nehru's personality
and moral commitment to the establishment of the world's
largest democracy greatly contributed to India's global
stature. His egalitarian values and charismatic leadership
imparted a lasting imprint on India's international demeanor.
India's laudable ideals and founding principles, however,
were overshadowed by its abject poverty and military weakness.
Unfortunately for newly independent India, great powers were
not based on moral righteousness but on their economic and
military muscle.
A. NON-ALIGNMENT
A key leader in the drive for independence from Britain
and the first Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal
Nehru was the architect of Indian foreign, economic, and
national security policy. Because Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy
and campaign of non-violence helped expel the British from the
subcontinent, Nehru felt that military force was not the
primary method to accomplish his political agenda. 5 His
vision for the future of India was based on a combination of
British parliamentary democracy, secular liberalism, Fabian
socialism, the ideals of Gandhi, and the centrally planned
economy of the Soviet Union.
Although Nehru's primary goal was the social and economic
improvement of India he was keenly interested in foreign
affairs. Nehru realized that India's foreign relations would
have a major impact on his domestic agenda. As an
accomplished scholar and writer, he was unusually well versed
in world history and international relations. It was no
surprise to those around him that Nehru chose to serve as his
own foreign minister. With an inward- looking, secular
perspective, Nehru believed that India should "keep away from
the power politics of groups, aligned against one another" and
focus on its own agricultural and industrial modernization,
B.R. Nanda, ed., Indian Foreign Policy, the Nehru Years
(Delhi: Vikas, 1976) 2.
the construction of a solid democratic infrastructure, and the
eradication of poverty. 6 He realized that agricultural
innovations and massive industrialization were necessary in
order to raise the overall standard of living for the great
mass of India's people. Nehru also understood that these
advancements were crucial if the young republic ever hoped to
fulfill his lofty global aspirations.
Nehru's ideas of neutrality with regard to the Cold War
and his concentration on India's domestic problems led him to
a policy of non-alignment. What Nehru described as staying
clear of foreign entanglements the United States interpreted
as condoning Soviet communism. Prime Minister Nehru's
rationale for non-alignment was also based on his perception
of India as a potential great power:
I can understand some of the smaller countries
of Europe or some of the smaller countries of
Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down
before some of the greater powers and becoming
practically satellites of those powers,
because they cannot help it. The power
opposed to them is so great and they have
nowhere to turn. But I do not think that
consideration applies to India. . . India is
too big a country herself to be bound down to
any country, however big it may be.
Dominance over neighboring states, territorial conquest,
and regional hegemony were not Nehru's concerns. As Prime
Minister he felt that the resolution of India's immense
Nanda 3
.
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy ( [Delhi] : unknown
publ., [1961]) 32. (emphasis added).
internal problems was his chief objective. The mass migration
that followed partition led to horrendous communal violence
between Hindus , Muslims, and Sikhs. Poverty, communalism, and
ethnic conflict threatened to destroy the Indian Union before
it could hope to achieve its "rightful" place in the global
pecking order.
One of the best summaries of how and why non-alignment
became the basis of Indian foreign policy is in the form of a
personal letter written by Nehru to the first Indian
ambassador to the People's Republic of China:
Our general policy is to avoid entanglement in
power politics and not to join any group of
powers as against any other group. The two
leading groups today are the Russian bloc and
the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly
to both and yet not join either. Both America
and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of
each other as well as of other countries.
This makes our path difficult and we may well
be suspected by each of leaning towards the
other. This cannot be helped. 8
This brief letter explains the dilemma that faced India's
founding father. If he embraced the United States and its
allies, he would upset his powerful neighbor, the Soviet
Union. On the other hand, if Nehru was perceived as backing
the Soviets too much, Washington would put India on its list
of enemies. Again, in Nehru's words:
Our foreign policy will ultimately be governed
by our internal policy. That policy is far
from being Communistic and is certainly
opposed to the Communist Party of India.
Nevertheless, there is a great and growing
Nanda 134-35.
10
feeling in India in favour of some kind of
vague socialist order of society. There is
much goodwill for America and expectation of
help from her in many fields, especially
technical. There is also a great deal of
sympathy for the work of the Soviet Union and
the remarkable change that this has brought
about among the people. The Soviet Union,
being our neighbour, we shall inevitably
develop close relations with it. We cannot
afford to antagonize Russia merely because we
think that this may irritate someone else.
Nor indeed can we antagonize the USA. 9
Relations between the United States and India, never
robust to begin with, grew progressively worse. India and the
United States were politically opposed on many issues: the
French presence in Indochina, the creation of Israel, the non-
recognition of Communist China, , and the international
regulation of nuclear power.
Personal relationships between India's leaders and U.S.
officials were not much better. After meeting with Nehru
during his first visit to the United States in the fall of
1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote that Nehru "was
one of the most difficult men I have ever had to deal with." 10
The Indian Prime Minister later remarked that he found the
dinner conversation at the White House "less than
intellectually scintillating"." Thus, the tone was set for






In an attempt to demonstrate the importance of India in
world affairs the Nehru government tried to play peacemaker
during the Korean War. India sought to bridge the
communication gap between North Korea's allies and the United
States. Nehru notified President Truman that if U.N. forces
crossed the 3 8th parallel, China would enter the war on behalf
of North Korea. Truman dismissed the warning as a ruse. When
Chinese troops did attack, Nehru gained little favor with
Washington for being right. 12
Languid diplomatic and personal affiliations between
India and the United States hampered the emergence of strong,
friendly relations. Washington saw non-alignment as a policy
of appeasement towards Soviet Communism. By not opposing the
Soviet Union, therefore, U.S. policy makers reasoned that
India had lent its tacit support to Moscow's expansionist
ideology. Nehru's policy of non-alignment violated America's
prime directive- -the containment of communism. Washington's
simplistic view that all communist movements were being
directed and ultimately controlled by Moscow was not accepted
by Nehru. 13 He felt that the U.S. -led crusade against
communism, especially in South East Asia, was suppressing
Asian nationalism by supporting the remnants of European
imperialism. Unyielding in their principles and beliefs,
'- S.N. Misra, India The Cold War Years (New Delhi: South
Asian Publishers, 1994) 83.
13 Misra 103.
12
Nehru and Truman talked past one another. This caused the
formation of a mutual misunderstanding of each country's grand
strategy. This misunderstanding later became
institutionalized in the foreign policy making bureaucracies
of both governments.
Ashok Kapur, a prominent Indian scholar, offers a
different perspective on the development of non-alignment. He
proposes that the strategy of non-alignment developed from
pure realpolitik vice Nehruvian idealism. Kapur implies that
Nehru used idealist rhetoric to mask India's military and
economic weakness in order to engage in the power politics of
the bipolar world:
Indian nonalignment is nothing but a strategy
of being engaged in power politics but doing
so preferably through diplomacy, given India's
military and economic weakness. 14
Mr. Kapur ' s . deduction suggests that Nehru was trying to form
a third, non-aligned pole in the U.S. -Soviet dominated world
order.
Whether non-alignment is based on egalitarian Indian
ideals, pure power politics, or a combination of both, its
stated goals were clear: keep India out of foreign
entanglements, establish peaceful relations with the world's
strongest nations, and raise India's status in the global
order. In retrospect, one can conclude that non-alignment was
not very successful in achieving its stated objectives.
Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option (New York: Praeger
Publishing, 1976) 48.
13
By not joining with the United States and its allies
against the Soviet Union, non-alignment involved India in what
it so desperately wanted to avoid. Although fighting never
erupted between the United States and the Soviet Union in
South Asia, superpower influence and presence did increase in
the region.
The United States became distrustful of Indian motives
and indifferent to Indian desires. Having "lost" mainland
China, dogmatic U.S. policy makers, like John Foster Dulles,
did not see non-alignment as a middle road between the two
emerging power blocks. The consensus in Washington was that
Indian neutralism was the equivalent to being pro- communist
.
15
Although non-alignment may have gained some attention in
strategic circles, the Third World, and the media, it did not
make India a great power. In the United States, India, once
described as "the pivotal state in non-Communist Asia by
virtue of its relative power, stability and influence" was now
shunned and ignored by the premier superpower. 16 With the
military, political, and economic might of the United States
still expanding, India rejected the security of a potential
omnipotent ally and, instead, opted for the flexibility of
non - al ignment
.
Harold A. Gould, "U.S. -Indian Relations: The Early Phase,"
in Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly, eds .
,
The Hope and the
Reality U.S. -Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (Boulder:
Westview Press 1992) 34.
16 Kux 87.
14
Non-alignment failed to keep India out of Cold War
politics, but it did demonstrate Nehru's desire for great
power status. By offering the developing world an alternative
to the emerging bipolar balance of power, Nehru felt that
India could establish its own influential position among the
great powers. India would create and offer to lead the non-
aligned movement in the hope that many Third World nations
would follow.
B . PANCHSHEEL
In October 1950 Chinese troops occupied Tibet and
asserted control. Nehru displayed diplomatic patience and
restraint towards China's overt aggression against India's
northern neighbor. Nehru did not want to challenge China over
Tibet. Instead he sought "to bring them [China] round to an
uninhibited, peaceful and good neighbourly attitude." 17 Nehru
felt that by appeasing China on this issue he could alleviate
any fears and suspicions it might hold concerning India's
ultimate strategic motives. Nehru felt that cooperation and
peaceful coexistence with Communist China were necessary in
order to focus attention on India's pressing domestic
problems
.
A natural corollary to non-alignment, panchsheel




Indian agreement over Tibet. 18 Panchsheel consisted of five
principles
:
1. Mutual respect for each other's integrity and
sovereignty
2. Non-aggression
3. Non-interference in each other's national affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence.
Although the Chinese signed the document, they did not put as
much faith in the aims of panchsheel as did India's Prime
Minister. The Chinese leadership believed much of their own
rhetoric about the inevitable clash between communism and
capitalism. More importantly, however, Chinese strategic
interests differed from those of India, especially in the
disputed border regions between the two states. 19 India's
choice to remain a member of the British Commonwealth, was
also misinterpreted by China. Chairman Mao and his sycophants
were distrustful of India's ties to Western capitalism.
Nehru was forced to strike a balance between his
sympathetic feelings for the plight of the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan people and peaceful relations with India's powerful
neighbor, China. Prime Minister Nehru feared that a strong,
18 John Lall, Aksaichin and Sino- Indian Conflict (New Delhi:
Allied Publishers, 1989) 238.
For more information on China's strategic interests during
this time frame refer to Steven A. Hoffman, India and the China
Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) or John
Lall, Aksaichin and Sino- Indian Conflict .
16
centrally controlled China might try to expand its borders as
it had during past dynasties. Keeping with the spirit of
panchsheel, Nehru chose to ignore the age old advice of
Kautilya (that neighboring states should be treated as enemies
or potential enemies) for he felt that any sort of military or
political action might provoke the Chinese.
C. SINO- INDIAN BORDER DISPUTES
Colonial India's borders had been the responsibility of
Great Britain. In the northern most regions of British India,
because of the mountainous terrain, sparse population, and the
lack of overall investment value, the Crown had felt that
flexible buffer zones and not rigid, linear borders were
sufficient means to protect against Russian and Chinese
encroachment on Britain's prosperous holdings in Northern
India. Historically the peoples of inner Asia viewed the area
between India proper and China as boundless and unrestricted.
European linear borders were alien to these peoples' nomadic
traditions and customs.
In light of the hostilities between Pakistan and India
over Kashmir, Nehru needed to establish a definable
northwestern border. in addition to Kashmir, the occupation
of Tibet also created the requirement for definable northern
borders. Independent Tibet had served as a buffer between
China and India. Nehru realized that a recognized border was
17
the first step necessary in order to establish a line of
defense against any future threat from Chinese occupied
Tibet . :o
Acting as his own Minister for External Affairs, Nehru
concluded that the modern Sino- Indian border was clearly
defined by the linking of known border points on the basis of
the highest watershed, certain topographical features, trade,
grazing practices, administration, revenue collection, and the
legal precedence of past colonial treaties. 21 Based on this
logic Nehru established India's northeastern border as the
McMahon Line (1914) in the Assam Himalayas. This area
included the disputed Tawang tract (refer to Appendix A) . To
delineate the outer boundaries of Indian controlled Kashmir,
Nehru utilized the Ardagh- Johnson line (1897) . This put the
Indian border well to the north of the Karakoram mountain
range, and included the Aksai Chin plateau (see Appendix A)
.
Consistent with his foreign policy and the preservation
of the spirit of panchsheel, Prime Minister Nehru chose not to
militarize the declared borders in the northeast and Aksai
Chin regions . By the late 1950s a series of events had
raised doubts about the future of Sino- Indian relations. A
dispute over the Bara Hoti grazing ground on the Uttar
Pradesh-Tibet border, and the discovery of a Chinese built
Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley
University of California Press, 1990) 24.
:i Hoffmann 26.
18
road that ran through the Indian portion of the Aksai Chin
plateau connecting the Sinkiang province of China with Tibet
further strained Sino- Indian relations (see Appendix A)
.
Fighting between Indian and Chinese troops first occurred
on 25 August 1959 around an Indian NEFA (Northeast Frontier
Agency) outpost called Longju. Chinese troops fired on an
Indian patrol, killing one Indian rifleman. All the other
Indian soldiers involved were taken prisoner, but many later
managed to escape. The next day the Chinese attacked the
Longju outpost forcing the Indian troops to withdraw."
China claimed that Longju and other Indian posts were
erected on Chinese territory. China's People's Liberation
Army (PLA) also suspected that Indian armed forces were
covertly supporting Tibetan resistance fighters. Indian
sentiments and public outcry over this and other related
border incidents gave the illusion that India was being
victimized by an overly aggressive China.
Nehru corresponded with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai
several times over the disputed border regions in an attempt
to learn China's long term designs and strategies. Nehru
then elected to take a diplomatic hard line with China over
the border issue. This course of action caused friction to




D. 1962 SINO- INDIAN WAR
In 1962 Prime Minister Nehru escalated Indian military-
activity in the disputed border regions. His "forward policy"
directed Indian personnel to attempt to cut Chinese lines of
communication with their frontier posts. Indian troops were
also ordered to hold their ground and open fire if PLA forces
tried to push them back. 23 Revealing his own idealistic
hubris, Nehru ordered additional troops to Ladakh (northeast
Kashmir) and established additional outposts. China responded
by constructing more border stations.
On 20 October 1962, after many small border skirmishes,
Chinese troops attacked Indian positions and advanced
simultaneously across the disputed border areas in Ladakh and
Assam. As Indian forces were rolled back at both ends of the
McMahon line, Nehru, fearing an all-out Chinese invasion,
declared a state of emergency. Realizing India was woefully
unprepared to defend itself militarily against the Chinese
assault, Prime Minister Nehru made a desperate appeal for
military assistance to the United Kingdom and the United
States. British military hardware arrived immediately, while
the first American supplies came within a few days of Nehru's
request
.
Lome J. Kavic, India's Quest For Security: Defence
Policies, 1947-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967) 170.
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By 19 November 1962 the situation had grown so desperate
in the NEFA/Assam theater that Nehru made an additional
request to Washington for air support to counter the advancing
PLA forces. On 21 November 1962, before President Kennedy-
could send his reply, the Chinese unexpectedly announced they
would pull back beyond the McMahon line provided Indian troops
did not try to occupy the vacated territory. India had no
choice but to comply.
E. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SINO- INDIAN WAR
The most glaring result of the, 1962 Sino- Indian border
conflict was India's military weakness. Chinese troops easily
assaulted and out maneuvered Indian defenses. Indian command
and control, logistics, and battlefield tactics were lacking.
The PLA could have overrun the entire North Eastern Frontier
Agency at will, but instead the Chinese leadership chose to
withdraw its forces.
The loss of the Sino- Indian border conflict was a
humiliating setback for India's "tryst with destiny." Nehru's
vision of newly independent India instantly attaining an
influential station among the great nations of the world was
dealt a crushing blow. China's victory proved that even in
the twentieth century great power still flowed from the barrel
of a gun.
21
Nehru had focused his government's efforts and resources
on nation building and economic development. Various domestic
programs were initiated in order to modernize India's
agriculture and industry, decrease the level of poverty,
provide educational opportunities, and build a strong economic
base for the future. While these programs were both necessary
and commendable, they came at the expense of Indian national
security
.
India's embarrassing defeat forced Nehru to acknowledge
the overall lack of preparation for the defense of India and
the danger of a moralistic foreign policy. Confirming these
central themes, one scholar summarized that:
Nehru made the cardinal blunder of neglecting
India's strength while pursuing friendship
with China. History shows us no illustrations
where two competitors managed to develop a
genuine relationship of mutual respect and
friendship with great inequalities in their
economic and military strength. 24
Nehru was also forced to compromise his policy and
principle of non-alignment during the China crisis. By asking
for and receiving military aid from the Western powers, non-
alignment would, henceforth, be open to interpretation by
successive generations of Indian leaders.
:4 Baljit Singh, Indian Foreign Policy: An Analysis (Lucknow,
India: Ananda Press, 1976) 78.
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F. THE LEGACY OF NEHRU
Like George Washington, Nelson Mandela, and other
renowned liberators, Jawaharlal Nehru will be remembered for
his leadership during India's struggle for independence. In
addition to his exploits against British imperialism, Nehru
also judiciously governed India for seventeen years. During
this formative period "Nehru gave India a place on the world
stage through sheer force of personality." 25 Prime Minister
Nehru also drafted the blueprints for India's political,
economic, and military future.
Politically, Nehru' s concentration on domestic , economic,
and social programs gave rise to a non-aligned foreign policy
which has endured, in one form or another, throughout the
later half of twentieth century. The five principles
expressed in panchsheel (peaceful coexistence) were a direct
corollary to Nehru's concept of non-alignment and continue to
serve as the basis of India's foreign policy. 26
In addition to non-alignment and panchsheel, Nehru also
further consolidated the Indian Union by reconfiguring the
states along linguistic lines and negotiating the transfer of
the French enclaves of Pondicherry and Chandernagar to Indian
Robert Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy Since 1971 (New
York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990) 17.
:b Bradnock 17.
23
control. He was also responsible for the decision to send
Indian troops to annex the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961.
Nehru stressed secular and egalitarian ideals for all of
India's people, including women, the lower castes, and
untouchables. With this in mind, both the Congress party and
Nehru set out to reduce the overall level of poverty.
Employing Soviet -style central planning techniques in a mixed
economy (directed by the central government but sustaining
capitalist traits) , a series of five year plans were initiated
with the goals of improving agricultural yields, restoring
consumer-good production, and kick starting heavy industry.
Nehru's admiration of socialist central economic
planning, an abhorrence of colonial imperialism, and his own
policy of non-alignment led India down the road of import
substitution and other costly autarkic economic practices.
Nehru chose a socialist economic route for India because of
his impassioned humanism and genuinely good intentions. But
due to the economic course selected by Nehru and continued by
his immediate successors, India is just now beginning the
process of integrating its economy with the more successful
capitalist, free market global community.
In hind sight, Nehru's decision to devote the vast
majority of India's resources toward industrialization and
economic improvement before developing a sound military
defense proved to be costly. The humiliating defeat by the
Chinese in 1962 obliged Nehru to be more pragmatic towards
24
military matters. A significant portion of India's budget
would be devoted to the construction of modern air, land, and
maritime forces- - funds Nehru would have much rather spent on
educational and social programs.
Thirty years after his death, Nehru's legacy continues to
influence Indian domestic, foreign, and economic policies.
Although his dynastic line ended with the assassination of his
grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, India's leaders continue to abide by
Nehru's nobel principles as expressed in the Indian
constitution:
to secure to all its citizens . . .JUSTICE
social, economic and political; LIBERTY of
thought, expression, belief, faith and
worship; EQUALITY of status and opportunity;
and to promote among them all FRATERNITY
assuring the dignity of the individual and the
unity of the Nation. 27
These liberal ideals continue to survive in what appears to be
a fatalistic, communal society on the verge of anarchy. Yet,
due to Prime Minister Nehru's determined leadership strong
democratic institutions developed and managed to survive
amongst vast linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity.
Perhaps Nehru's greatest contribution to India's drive for
great power status was his commitment to the ideals embodied
in the Indian constitution.
Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India . 3rd ed. (New York
Oxford University Press, 1989) 356.
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III. 1962-1971: THE CLASH OF REALPOLITIK AND IDEALISM
The nine years between 1962-1971 delineate the second
phase of independent India's existence. During this time
frame the ideals, goals, and aspirations of Nehru were
challenged by internal and external events and forces. India
emerged from this turbulent decade not as a great global power
but a potential regional one.
The smooth succession of Lai Bahadur Shastri to Prime
Minister following Nehru's death lent credibility to India's
democratic institutions. Shastri' s brief but pivotal
administration had to contend with many difficulties: a war
over Kashmir with Pakistan, internal language riots, China's
first nuclear explosion, the expanding Cold War, and domestic
debate over the indigenous production of the atomic bomb.
When Shastri became .the second Indian Prime Minister to
die in two years, Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter and
confidante, was chosen to lead the country. Like her father,
Indira also desired a great global role for India. Mrs.
Gandhi's quest for political power, war on poverty, and
foreign policies drew both criticism and adoration. Her
pursuit of national interests would earn India the title of
regional hegemon.
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A. SHASTRI COMES TO POWER
Jawaharlal Nehru governed India until his death on 24 May
1964. Nehru's successor, Lai Bahadur Shastri, was chosen by
a consensus of the Congress party elite. A man of humble
origins, Shastri diligently worked his way to the top of the
Congress party hierarchy during the struggle for independence
from Great Britain. In 1950 he became general secretary of
the Congress party while Nehru ascended to the presidency of
the organization.
Shastri took office on the ebb of India's declining
international influence. The force and magnetism of India's
leadership of the non-aligned movement began to fade with
Nehru's death. Congruently, the centrally planned Indian
economy had made little progress in the war on poverty, while
national prestige had never recovered from China's humbling
show of force in 1962 border conflict. In addition to these
pressures, India's second prime minister was also forced to
settle crucial domestic dilemmas.
In 1963 parliament passed the Official Languages Act,
which called for Hindi, written in the Devanagari script, to
be the official language of the country beginning January 26,
1965. As this date approached anti-Hindi riots broke out in
southern India. Southern Indian states, with Dravidian based
languages, viewed the implementation of the Official Language
Act as internal ethno- linguistic oppression. As a result of
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the violent opposition to the adoption of Hindi, the Shastri
government struck a compromise with the southern states, and
agreed in 1965 to an indefinite continuation of English as the
second official language of the country. 28
In October 1964 the People's Republic of China tested a
nuclear weapon and became the world's fifth declared nuclear
power. The Chinese test sparked an intense nuclear debate
inside India. To date India's nuclear program (initiated
under the Nehru Administration) had been utilized only for
peaceful purposes. In light of the 1962 Sino- Indian war and
the Chinese nuclear test, Indian public opinion called for a
policy shift. In response to this intense political pressure,




While Shastri 's strategy of compromise resolved India's
predicaments de jour, his " [d] iminutive, retiring, and
moderate" leadership style projected an image of weakness,
especially to Pakistan's leader, Ayub Khan. 30 Khan's
estimation of India's lack of political resolve and military
strength was fortified in April of 1965 when Pakistani forces
scored an apparent victory in the Rann of Kutch.
Craig Baxter, Yageudra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and
Robert C. Oberst, eds
.
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B. THE RANN OF KUTCH AND THE SECOND INDO- PAKISTANI WAR
The Rann of Kutch is a large, uninhabited tidal mud flat
located between Pakistan (West Pakistan in 1965) and India and
bordering the Arabian Sea (see Appendix B) . Both countries
laid claim to the area which had little strategic or economic
value. Early in 1965 Pakistani forces began patrolling the
northern edge of the Rann to assert their territorial claim.
The Indians also sent patrols and clashes erupted. A brigade
size battle was fought on 27 April 1965 which concluded with
the withdrawal of Indian troops. Later a cease-fire agreement
was brokered by the British which effectively ended
hostilities over the Rann.
Based on India's declining status and the apparent
weakness of the Shastri government, Khan decided to launch a
military campaign to capture the much disputed region of
Kashmir. Operation Gibraltar, as it was known, called for a
mass infiltration of Pakistani trained guerrillas into Indian
held Kashmir. The guerrillas were to agitate the masses and
start a peasant uprising against Indian forces. The revolt
would provide justification for regular Pakistani troops to
assist their Kashmiri comrades.
The plan did not materialize as Khan had envisioned.
Many of the infiltrators were caught by Indian forces, and the
"oppressed" Kashmiri masses did not rise up as anticipated.
Rather than acknowledge defeat, Khan launched a major
30
offensive in southern Kashmir in an attempt to cut off
Srinagar, the capital, from Indian control. The Indians
unexpectedly countered by launching a strike into West
Pakistan, which reached the outskirts of Lahore.
The Soviets and Chinese opted to stay out of the
fighting. The United States cut off all economic and military
aid to both India and Pakistan. As the war, which neither
side could afford, reached an inconclusive state of attrition,
the Soviet Union offered its good offices to negotiate a peace
settlement. The United States, which had its hands full in
Vietnam, acquiesced to the Soviet offer to mediate.
Shastri and Khan met with Soviet Premier, Andrei Kosygin
in January 1966 at Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia. The
accord that was signed between India and Pakistan was
considered a significant achievement given the level of
hostility between the two neighbors. The jubilation of the
Tashkent Accords was short lived, however, as Prime Minister
Shastri died of a heart attack only hours after signing the
agreement
.
Shastri 's reign was short but significant. Nehru's
"diminutive" successor permitted the research which resulted
in a peaceful nuclear explosion in less than a decade. Under
his leadership India maintained its national interests by
stopping Pakistan from taking Kashmir by force. Shastri 's
willingness to compromise also led to an overall improvement
in relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union.
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The untimely death of India's second prime minister and the
smooth transition of power to Mrs. Gandhi demonstrated the
great resilience of India's democratic institutions, and
proved that democracy could survive in India after Jawaharlal
Nehru
.
C. THE RESILIENCY OF THE INDIAN STATE
Political stability is the first step for all states that
aspire for greatness. Economic prosperity, military might,
and international reputation all flow from lasting political
stability. Ethnic, communal, and linguistic tensions have
sparked riotous separatist movements and chaotic violence
throughout India. Yet somehow the democratic, multi-national
union has managed to maintain relative political stability
despite numerous internal and external crises.
During the Nehru years (1947-1964), India's political
institutions appeared to be in a rudimentary stage. Nehru's
charismatic leadership was thought to be the principal
component that held the newly formed union together. The
smooth shift of power to Shastri after Nehru's death reflected
the durability of India's political institutions. Unlike most
post- colonial , developing states, India's constitutional,
democratic infrastructure possessed enough inertia to carry on
even after the passing of its revolutionary founding father.
For Ayub Khan India's sheer size, huge population, and
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great power aspirations meant India could and would continue
to increase its military strength until it eclipsed that of
Pakistan. Khan, therefore, decided to launch a preventive war
against India while he still had a chance for victory.
The outcome of the 1965 Indo- Pakistani war was evidence
of India's institutionalized resolve to maintain the integrity
of its vital national interests, including Kashmir. It also
dispelled the widely held myth that the martial skills of one
Muslim soldier equalled those of ten Hindus.
Unlike Pakistan and many other newly independent states
created from former European colonies, India's government
never became the victim of a military coup d'etat. Three
strong institutions laid the foundation for India's solid and
secure form of government: 1) the National Congress Party;
2) the "steel frame" of the British bureaucracy; and 3) the
professionalism of the Indian army. 31
Under Nehru the military arm of this triad of sturdy
institutions was given the lowest priority until after the
Sino- Indian conflict. Upon Nehru's death the maintenance and
leadership of these entrenched institutions passed to Lai
Bahadur Shastri. In 1966 Indira Gandhi, India's third prime
minister, inherited the reigns of India's resilient
institutions. She would hold these reigns tight for fifteen
years (1966-1977 and 1980-1984)
.
31 Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India Under Pressure: Prospects
for Political Stability (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) 5.
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D. INDIRA RAJ BEGINS
Indira Gandhi was brought to power by the same seasoned
elite of the Congress Party (also known as the Syndicate) who
had selected her predecessor. Mrs. Gandhi was chosen by the
Syndicate in order to block the more conservative and
ambitious Morar j i Desai from reaching the office of Prime
Minister. The Syndicate also felt that the daughter of Nehru
would win them many votes through her renowned surname. The
party bosses also believed that Indira was a docile, malleable
woman, who would easily be manipulated to serve their specific
political agenda.
While Mrs. Gandhi proved to be highly popular at the
polls, she was not the marionette the Syndicate calculated her
to be. After three years in office, a decisive and strong
willed Indira Gandhi split the Congress party in order to
shore up her position as Prime Minister. Her wing of the
party (Congress (I)) boasted a more active, egalitarian social
platform than the remaining Congress Party controlled by the
Syndicate
.
In the midst of consolidating of her own political power,
Indira Gandhi implemented a new economic agenda that steered
India toward what was considered a more socialist path. Mrs
Gandhi's "mildly radical" economic agenda called for: the
nationalization of banks, the abolition of privy purses for
former princely rulers, the devaluation of the rupee, the
34
denouncement of industrial monopolies, and liberal loans for
the poorest sectors of Indian society. 32 However, other
scholars argue that:
Her actual economic policies, however, were
conservative and capitalist -oriented rather
than radical. They did not appear to benefit
the lowest rungs of India's socio-economic
hierarchy immediately, or contribute to the
officially endorsed long-term goal of a
'socialist form of society'. 33
Whether "mildly radical" or conservative in nature, Mrs.
Gandhi's economic policies earned her credibility from a wide
array of poor peasants and cosmopolitan intellectuals alike.
Like her father, Indira Gandhi focused the majority of
her energies as Prime Minister on foreign policy. 34 Mrs.
Gandhi understood that her egalitarian social programs were
linked to India's foreign policy posture. Sound foreign
relations with both the East and the West were required in
order to secure the financial aid, technological assistance,
military hardware, and large reserves of foreign exchange
needed to proceed with the Prime Minister's extensive domestic
plans. Mrs. Gandhi also believed, like her father, that
India's high global profile as the self -proclaimed leader of
the non-aligned movement helped construct a collective Indian
3: Baxter, Malik, Kennedy, and Oberst 64
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personality. Both Nehru and his daughter believed that a
collective national identity would furnish the diverse peoples
of India with a binding "Indianess" to prevent the
Balkanization of the subcontinent.
E. MRS. GANDHI'S CONTRIBUTION TO NON-ALIGNMENT
Indira Gandhi strongly supported her father's vision of
non-alignment. To Mrs. Gandhi non-alignment meant self-
reliance and autonomy for India. As Nehru's daughter and
closest confidante, she had seen first hand how non-alignment
based solely on ideals, was drowned out in the blaring bi-
polar international arena. As Prime Minister she was
determined to bolster her nation's economic and military power
in order to "prevent any erosion of [India's] independence." 35
Nehru's original concept of non-alignment matured into an
alternative socio-economic development model for the newly
independent states of the post-colonial world. Based largely
on moral righteousness, non-alignment offered its supporters
a middle path somewhere in between the East -West power blocks.
Non-alignment also served as India's most economically
sovereign ticket to co-equal status among the great "imperial"
and communist powers of the twentieth century. Following
India's humiliating defeat by China in 1962, however, Nehru





was forced to set aside the principle of non-alignment and ask
for military aid from the West. Henceforth, India's
unprejudiced leadership of the non-aligned movement was
somewhat discredited.
Indira Gandhi was much more pragmatic and flexible with
her interpretation of non-alignment than either Nehru or
Shastri. Her thinking was not guided by any theoretical world
view. Mrs. Gandhi made decisions and policy based on her
current understanding of the facts and circumstances of a
given situation. Having witnessed the shortcomings of non-
alignment, Indira wanted to stress that movement was not
synonymous with appeasement. In her first radio broadcast as
Prime Minister she stated:
In keeping with our heritage, we have followed
a policy of peace and friendship with all
nations, yet reserved to ourselves the right
to independent opinion. The principles which
have guided our foreign policy are in keeping
with the best traditions of our country, and
are wholly consistent with our national
interest, honour and dignity. They continue
to remain valid. 36
Mrs. Gandhi aspired to the spirit of non-alignment as set
forth by her father, but she also wanted to strengthen India's
relative power. Her aim was to increase India's military and
economic strength in order to give non-alignment a backbone.
Mrs. Gandhi also felt that non-alignment did not mean
that India was relegated to silence in international affairs.




India, according to Indira Gandhi, was free to tilt towards
one side or the other depending on national interest and
principle. For example, during the height of U.S. involvement
in the Vietnam war, Mrs. Gandhi repeatedly criticized the
Johnson administration for its bombing of North Vietnam even
though India was virtually dependent on U.S. food assistance.
While this annoyed President Johnson greatly, it boosted
India's image among the other non-aligned nations.
By late 1970 Indira Gandhi's "mildly radical" social and
economic programs were in full swing when, to her surprise,
the Indian Supreme Court struck down her executive order to
abolish privy purses for the former princely rulers. Prime
Minister Gandhi had also begun to clash with her own cabinet
over land reform and other drastic resource distribution
programs. Bent on realizing her political agenda, Mrs Gandhi
declared, "We are concerned not merely with remaining in power
but with using that power to ensure better life to the vast
majority of our people and satisfy their aspirations for just
social order." 37 Indira Gandhi's quest for absolute
political control appeared to be directly proportional to the
amount of opposition pitted against her.
While Indira Gandhi's domestic policies and efforts to
improve the military, social, and economic well being of India
were laudable, some scholars are critical of her overall
accomplishments. Surjit Mansingh suggests that, "her
Wolpert 386.
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preference for tangible power and her predilection for dealing
with crisis situations on an ad hoc basis may have served to
constrain and not enhance India's power." 38 Indira Gandhi's
quest for political control in order to conduct her domestic
agenda infused India's political institutions with a heavy
dose of realpolitik. While her carpe diem crisis management
style may have lacked long-range strategic vision, Mrs.
Gandhi's major contribution to India's role in international
affairs was "her endeavour to put an end to the policy of
seeking peace without strength. " iq
F. THE THIRD INDO- PAKISTANI WAR
While Mrs. Gandhi was consolidating her power in India,
events in East Pakistan were leading up to a civil war.
Mu j ibur Rahman's Awami League had emerged as the overwhelming
victor in Pakistan's general elections of 1970. This meant
that, for the first time in its short history, the Pakistani
government would be dominated by Bengali Muslims from East
Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the opposition
Pakistan People's Party, was not willing to accept Muj ibur as
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After a week of unproductive negotiations in March of
1971, Yahya Khan's military assumed control of East Pakistan,
which promptly declared itself the independent state of
Bangladesh. Mu j ibur Rahman was arrested by Khan's forces
while his Awami League colleagues sought refuge in India.
Many Bengali members of Yahya Khan's military
establishment in East Pakistan joined the Mukti Bahini
(Bangladeshi freedom fighters) . While Khan's troops tried to
suppress the rebel Mukti Bahini forces, millions of Bengali
refugees poured into the already troubled Indian states of
Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal. By July, 1971 an estimated
6.9 million refugees were living in 1000 camps throughout
these impoverished Indian states. 40
By September 1971 India was spending close to $200
million a month just to feed the Bengali refugees. 41 While
the refugee issue had a major impact on the moral conscience
of the world, the potential destabilization of West Bengal,
Assam, and the tribal hill states of the northeast threatened
India's national security. Northeastern India had a history
of communal and tribal violence. The refugee situation added
unnecessary fuel to the fire.
International criticism of Islamabad's military crack
down in East Pakistan coupled with intense domestic pressure
Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession
Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley
University of California Press, 1990) 152.
41 Wolpert 389.
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for New Delhi to stop the tide of refugees streaming into the
country made it clear to Mrs. Gandhi's what her course of
action should be. After careful consideration at all the
pertinent levels of analysis (i.e. international, regional,
and domestic), Indira decided it would be in India's best
interest if East Pakistan achieved independence as Bangladesh.
Fearing continued communal, tribal, and irredentist violence
spreading throughout northeastern India, Indira Gandhi's
government also wanted a stable, preferably democratic,
administration to rule Bangladesh.
On August 9, 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed a
twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation.
Mrs. Gandhi, having received tacit superpower approval,
escalated Indian involvement in the Pakistani civil war. Aid
and assistance was increased to the Mukti Bahini . In response
the Pakistani government ordered the full mobilization of its
armed forces. India answered by mobilizing its armed
forces. 4: In late November 1971, three divisions of Indian
troops advanced and held key territory along the border areas
of East Pakistan. The official Indian statement was that this
was a defensive response to Pakistani shelling of Indian
territory. Then in early December of 1971, Pakistan's leader
General Kahn, unsure of Indian ambitions, ordered the
Pakistani Air Force to attack several major airfields in
northwestern India. India retaliated with a full scale
i: Kux 289-307.
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invasion of East Pakistan. Dhaka, the capital of East
Pakistan, was captured within a month. General Khan's forces
surrendered and Bangladesh became an independent state.
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IV. 1971-199 0: REGIONAL HEGEMONY AND THE COLD WAR
India's quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union, the
creation of Bangladesh, and the 1972 Simla agreements with
Pakistan marked the emergence of India as South Asia's
unparalleled regional power. With Soviet backing and the
threat of Pakistani military incursions into Kashmir
temporarily nullified, India could once again set its sights
on achieving great power status. First, however, India needed
to turn inward in order to address its multitude of domestic
problems
.
In March 1971, prior to the third Indo-Pak war, Indira
Gandhi and the Congress (I) party swept India's fifth general
election. Indira's political machine won a clear majority in
the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) . Trying to fulfill
her popular campaign catchphrase, "Garibi Hatao" (eliminate
poverty) , Mrs Gandhi continued to lead India down a centrally
controlled, socialist path. In order to carry out her plans
Prime Minister Gandhi greatly increased the power of the
central government at the expense of state and local
authorities. In her effort to consolidate domestic support
Mrs. Gandhi strained the already tense ethnic, communal, and
caste divisions of the Indian body politic. This ultimately
led to her demise in the aftermath of Operation Bluestar.
While the effects of Mrs. Gandhi's economic policies and
her quest for political power may have hampered India's drive
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for great power status, the victory over Pakistan, the
detonation of a nuclear device, and the continued
modernization of the armed forces certainly did not. India's
close friendship with the Soviet Union in conjunction with
President Nixon's tilt toward Pakistan further distanced India
from the U.S. led Western alliance. Despite American
alienation and several violent domestic crises, India
maintained its position of regional supremacy throughout the
1980s.
A. INDO- SOVIET FRIENDSHIP
Indo- Soviet relations had continued to develop ever since
the death of Stalin. Under Indira Gandhi, the bond between
India and the Soviet Union reached its high water mark with
the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation in August of 1971. Short of a full fledged
alliance, the treaty was a formal acknowledgement of the
"combination of convergences and divergences" in Soviet and
Indian foreign and domestic policies. 43 The treaty ultimately
led to a strong and lasting military association between the
Soviet Union and India.
Although it may have appeared as if India was under the
Soviet thumb, Indira Gandhi had no intention of joining forces
with the Communist Bloc. She pursued international
43 Mansingh 131.
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relationships for their pragmatic value. Indira Gandhi
herself expressed that:
The Soviet Union is a neighbour. We have to
think of it differently from overseas
powers . "
The Soviet Union's geographic proximity and Pakistan's strong
links to the United States and China left India with few
alternatives for powerful friends.
B. NIXON'S TILT TOWARD PAKISTAN
Mrs. Gandhi had a three pronged approach to U.S. -Indian
relations: 1) win U.S. support for India's vital national
security interests; 2) demonstrate India's resolve to maintain
its international independence; and 3) promote Indian economic
development. 45 Mrs. Gandhi was unsuccessful at achieving
these goals largely due to Cold War politics and the resulting
U.S. lack of interest.
When Richard Nixon took up residence in the White House
in 1969 his number one priority in Asia was to get the United
States out of Vietnam with honor. Nixon and Kissinger felt
that their "policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite
simply, to avoid adding another complication to [the]
agenda." 40 Nixon also held preconceived notions about Indian
44 Mansingh 131.
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non-alignment, dismissing some of his predecessors beliefs on
the subject as "alleged obsequiousness toward India" and
"liberal sof t-headedness . " 47
Nixon and Kissinger's perceptions of the troubles in East
Pakistan were tainted by their view of the Cold War.
President Nixon believed that India was being prodded by the
Soviet Union to split Pakistan. Indian support for the
liberation of Bangladesh was interpreted by Nixon and
Kissinger as a plot to destroy Pakistan, a staunch U.S. ally
in the crusade against communism. Unbenounced to India and
the world, Pakistan's strategic importance to the United
States had been secretly elevated due to its advantageous link
to the People's Republic of China. Throughout the crisis in
East Pakistan the Nixon Administration had been using Pakistan
as a conduit to open relations with China. Because of
Kissinger's clandestine dealings via Pakistan, the United
States had stumbled into the problems of South Asia, which it
had previously declared were of little interest. Nixon
proceeded to further embroil the United States in South Asia's
latest regional dispute by his endorsement of General Kahn's
efforts throughout the civil war. Nixon needed Pakistan's
cooperation in order to court Chinese friendship. 48
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little,
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Nixon and Kissinger claimed that their policy in South
Asia maintained the global balance of power by thwarting
Soviet aggression. India, they believed, was a Soviet
surrogate that sought to eliminate Pakistan and embarrass the
United States. Nixon felt that strong support for West
Pakistan would check the USSR and simultaneously demonstrate
to the Chinese that America supports its friends even during
unpopular crises. Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise battle
group into the Bay of Bengal in 1971 to intimidate India from
attacking West Pakistan. This action infuriated the Indians,
pushing them even closer to the Soviets. Some even believe
that Nixon's actions accelerated India's nuclear testing
program. 4"
India viewed General Khan's crack down in East Pakistan
as a domestic and regional concern. India had little interest
in Superpower politics. Because of West Pakistan's brutal
efforts to suppress the Mukti Bahini close to ten million East
Pakistani Bengalis had sought refuge in northeastern India.
This posed a major threat to the security of the entire Indian
state
.
Goaded by personal antipathy, the rift in U.S. -Indian
relations grew, primarily due to each country's opposing,
altruistic political objectives which emanated from the Cold
War. Nixon, who had a special affinity for Pakistan, tilted
U.S. foreign policy in favor of India's principal antagonist
4
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in pursuit of U.S. global interests. Mrs. Gandhi, on the
other hand, gravitated closer to the Soviet Union in her quest
for strategic leverage and balance in order to pursue regional
aims. Because of the mutual miscommunication, mistrust, and
alienation between the Nixon administration and the government
of Indira Gandhi, Indo-American relations declined to an all-
time low.
C. INDIA'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
On 18 May 1974 the Indian Atomic Energy Commission
detonated an underground nuclear device at Pokharan, a test
cite located in the Rajasthan desert. Reversing her previous
"no nuke" position, Mrs. Gandhi gave the go ahead for India's
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in order to boost her sagging
popularity at the polls by tapping Indian pride. 50
The success of the Pokharan test inspired India's
domestic nuclear proponents and earned India membership in the
exclusive nuclear club. Before Pokharan only the Soviet
Union, United States, France, Britain, and China had
demonstrated an overt atomic weapons capability. India now
had become the world's sixth nuclear power.
Prime Minister Gandhi received international criticism
for the Pokharan test. Canada, a principal supplier of
technology and material to India's nuclear program, condemned
50 Kux 314.
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the explosion and cut off all nuclear cooperation. 51 In the
United States, the nuclear nonprolif eration lobby along with
many members of Congress wanted to punish India for its
peaceful nuclear explosion. 52 The Nixon's administration,
besieged by the Watergate scandal, offered only a mild
statement concerning the Pokharan test. Secretary of State
Kissinger felt that strong, punitive actions against India
would only worsen the already poor state of Indo-American
relations
.
The Pokharan test once again demonstrated India's
collective desire for great power status. Unlike Kissinger
and Nixon, Indira Gandhi did not base her foreign relations on
Cold War dogma. Her decision to explode a nuclear device was
strongly influenced by her perception of the domestic
political fortune she stood to lose. 53 India's prominent
scientific bureacracy also was a major factor in Mrs. Gandhi's
decision to conduct the PNE
.
Rampant inflation caused by the devaluation of the rupee,
the 1973 oil embargo, increasing unemployment, and the failure
to implement her 1971 campaign promises caused Mrs. Gandhi's
popularity to plummet. Prime Minister Gandhi perceived that
a majority of Indians favored India's joining the nuclear





a nuclear power greatly appealed to the voter's national
pride, and diverted attention away from Mrs. Gandhi's failed
domestic policies.
D. THE EMERGENCY
Indira Gandhi's augmentation and centralization of
federal power caused the voting population to focus all
responsibility for government action and or inaction on the
office of prime minister. 54 In 1973 and 1974 food shortages,
rising prices, and local political grievances began to give
rise to mass demonstrations. These demonstrations turned
violent in the states of Gujarat and Bihar. Mrs. Gandhi's
sycophantic chief ministers proved incapable of handling these
crises
.
In June of 1975, adding to the Prime Minister's
difficulties, the Allahabad High Court ruled that Mrs.
Gandhi's 1971 landslide election victory was invalid due to
"corrupt practices" during the campaign. 55 The court ruling
greatly eroded Mrs. Gandhi's political legitimacy and sparked
even stronger opposition against her.
On 26 June 1975, at the request of Prime Minister Gandhi,
the President of India, Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, declared a state
Francis Robinson, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India.
Pakistan. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 175.
Robinson 175.
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of emergency as per Article 352 of the Indian Constitution.
Defacto martial law was declared and all key members of Mrs.
Gandhi's opposition were jailed. The upcoming 1976 elections
were suspended, the press censored, and civil liberties
curtailed as Prime Minister Gandhi assumed authoritarian
control of India.
By 1977 Indira Gandhi could no longer ignore the mass
discontent with her authoritarian rule. She called for new
parliamentary elections and relaxed some of the emergency
restrictions. To her surprise the opposition parties, led by
the Janata (People's) Party gained a two thirds majority of
the Lok Sabha.
The Janata Party chose Mora j i Desai, a long time opponent
of Mrs. Gandhi, as Prime Minister. The Desai government
returned the country to normal democratic rule and improved
relations with the West. President Jimmy Carter's visit to
India in January of 1978 and a reciprocal visit in April by
Prime Minister Desai denoted the overall progress in Indo-
American relations. The continued improvement of relations,
however, was checked by the non-proliferation issue,
specifically the refueling of India's Tarapur nuclear
facility. 56
For a detailed description of the events surrounding
President Carter's dealings with the issue of refueling the Tarapur
nuclear facility see pages 356-362 in Dennis Kux's India and the
United States: Estranged Democracies .
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E. INDIRA RETURNS TO POWER
In 1980 Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress (I) Party were swept
back into power, capturing 350 of the 542 parliamentary seats.
Mrs. Gandhi's reelection came on the heels of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan intensified the Cold
War and elevated South Asia to a high foreign policy priority
for President Carter. Washington immediately began trying to
court Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq. The controversy
concerning Pakistan's questionable non-proliferation status
was pushed aside as the United States attempted to revive past
security ties in the region. Mrs. Gandhi's tacit approval of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the United States no
other alternative but to seek closer ties to Pakistan.
The newly elected Reagan Administration had made it clear
that rearming Pakistan would be necessary to check the
expansion of the "Evil Empire." President Reagan, thus,
proposed a 2.5 billion dollar economic and military assistance
program to Pakistan. 57 As could be expected, this did not sit
well with New Delhi.
In October 1981 President Reagan met with Indira Gandhi
in Cancun, Mexico while the two leaders were attending a
summit on global economic issues. Their friendly, personal
discourse warmed Indo- American relations, but did not lead to
57 Kux 3 82 .
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any major U.S. or Indian shifts in foreign policy. In 1982,
however, President Reagan invited Mrs. Gandhi to visit
Washington D.C.. The Prime Minister gladly accepted and
arrived in October of the same year. For her own reasons Mrs.
Gandhi wanted to strengthen ties with the United States even
though the two nations were at odds on numerous major issues.
Mrs. Gandhi made an effort to improve foreign relations
with the West because India was becoming increasingly
dependent on limited Soviet technology for industrial and
military development. Utilizing the warm, friendly
relationship that had been established between herself and
President Reagan, Mrs. Gandhi tried to sell India's position
with regard to the superpowers to Washington. While U.S.-
Indian relations did improve somewhat, Washington did not
significantly shift the thrust of its policy towards India.
Mrs. Gandhi always believed that India was a potential
great power. In her mind "self-reliant development [was] not
merely desirable, it [was] the only possible way" to overcome
India's massive economic woes and achieve a rightful place
amongst the great nations of the world. 58 Indira's style of
self-reliant realpolitik was clearly evident in her
interpretation and formulation of Indian foreign policy. On 30
October 1981, in an address before the students and faculty of
Indira Gandhi, People and Problems (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1982) 181.
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India's prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru University, Mrs. Gandhi
proclaimed:
Non-alignment is a policy, but not an
objective by itself. The objective is freedom
of judgement, and of action , so as to
safeguard the nation's true strengths and
basic interests. . .Military alliances entail
obligations that may not be entirely
consistent with a nation's interests. Hence
many countries, even within such alliances,
are somewhat restive and apprehensive about
bases and missiles located in their territory.
. .Nations cannot be classified as permanent
enemies or permanent allies. 59
Mrs. Gandhi's incorporation of Lord Palmerston's famous
maxim (i.e. England has no permanent friends or allies, only
permanent interests) in this speech was no mistake. It does
seem somewhat ironic, however, that a champion of the non-
aligned movement would employ the political philosophy of
former colonial masters to rationalize its own foreign policy.
F. OPERATION BLUESTAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
Mrs. Gandhi's relentless effort "to safeguard the
nation's true strengths and basic interests" channelled power
to the central government at the expense of the states. This
expansion of the federal government was challenged in the
Punjab, where Sikhs comprised a slight majority of the
population, but disproportionally dominated government and
business
.
I. Gandhi 180. (emphasis added).
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The affluent Akali Dal party drew its support by tapping
Sikh communal sentiments. Akali Dal leaders preached that New
Delhi was trying to "Hindu- ize" the Punjab and destroy Sikh
culture. In 1981 the party hierarchy called for mass
demonstrations against the central government. Then in 1982
the President of the Akali Dal issued a resolution that stated
that the principal purpose of the Akali Dal was to:
preserve and keep alive the concept of
distinct and independent identity of the Panth
[Sikh community] and to create an environment
in which national sentiments and aspiration of
the Sikh Panth will find full expression,
satisfaction and growth. 60
The resolution also listed seven objectives designed to
increase provincial autonomy for the Punjab. More Punjabi
autonomy would fortify the political power of the Akali Dal.
Akali Dal agitation gave way to violence as militant Sikh
groups took up the cause. The most prominent Sikh
fundamentalist leader was Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale
.
Preaching Sikh orthodoxy, Bhindranwale was implicated in
various politically motivated murders but never convicted. In
1981 he and a band of armed extremists established their
headquarters in the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the most holy
site of the Sikh faith.
The Gandhi government viewed "the Akali mixing of
religion and politics [as] incongruous with the secular and
Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith
(London: Allen & Unwin, 19 86) 219.
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democratic character of the Indian polity." 61 The strategy
and tactics of the Akali Dal and Bhindranwale ' s militant
terrorists were analogous to Northern Ireland's Irish
Republican Army and its political wing, Sinn Fein. And like
Great Britain, India too would deal with terrorism by calling
on the army.
Typical of her style, Indira cracked down hard on the
separatist Sikhs. Operation Bluestar, as it was known, called
for regular Indian Army troops to seal off the Punjab and
round up all suspected Sikh terrorists. On the evening of 5
June 1984, troops from the Indian Army assaulted the Golden
Temple in order to capture Bhindrawale and his loyal band of
extremists. What resulted was 576 deaths, 335 wounded, and
1512 extremist arrests. 62 Operation Bluestar "provoked a
wave of deep anguish and resentment among Sikhs." 63 Although
many Sikhs did not support the violent methods prescribed by
Bhindrawale, their sympathies clearly shifted in the wake of
the shoot out in Amritsar.
In October of 1984 Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated by two of
her own Sikh bodyguards. An alienated Sikh community showed
little remorse for the slain Prime Minister. In New Delhi and
Quote taken from "The Sikhs in Their Homeland India", a
government of India publication published in 1984.
These figures reflect combined Army and extremist
casualties, and were taken from the government of India
publication, "The Sikhs in Their Homeland India".
63 R. Kapur 23 5.
56
other cities throughout India, mobs attacked and looted Sikh
neighborhoods. In all over 2,000 Sikhs were killed and 10,000
were rendered homeless before the Army was called in to
restore order. 64 Further government inaction to investigate
allegations that Congress party officials had instigated anti-
Sikh violence consolidated the Sikh community behind what
remained of the Akali Dal. Martial law and military rule
restored order in the Punjab but stoked existing communal
tensions
.
G. RAJIV GANDHI: THE END OF THE NEHRU DYNASTY
After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv, her son,
was chosen as Prime Minister. At 40 years old Rajiv was the
youngest Nehru family member ever to lead India. American
educated, Rajiv had worked as an airline pilot prior to
entering politics. His personal style, good looks, and family
name made him extremely popular throughout India.
Under Mrs. Gandhi, the Indian government had pursued four
main foreign policy goals: 1) the enhancement of India's
territorial security; 2) optimal external economic relations
to accelerate modernization; 3) regional preeminence; and 4)
the amplification of India's voice in Third World politics. 65
04 R. Kapur 23 6
Harish Kapur, "India's Foreign Policy Under Rajiv Gandhi,"
The Round Table October, 1987: 469.
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Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in enhancing India's territorial
security, achieving regional supremacy, and amplifying India's
voice in Third World politics, however, her socialist programs
severely retarded the country's economic development.
A technocrat, Rajiv seemed to be more interested in
personal computers than the intricacies of foreign policy.
Thus, he accepted the practice of non-alignment and continued
to follow the same foreign policy goals delineated by his
mother. Rajiv, however, shifted the priority of these goals,
stressing economic liberalization and modernization above all
else. His ambition was to make India a model industrialized
power in the developing world. 66 He used his "star quality"
to court Western nations, making numerous visits abroad to
improve relations and drum up business.
Unlike his mother, Rajiv felt that a loosening of India's
license-permit raj and a more market oriented economy would
stimulate growth. Using Reaganomics as a model, Rajiv cut
taxes on wealth and inheritance, hoping to reverse the
stagnation of the centrally planned Indian economy. 67 But as
consumerism and economic liberalization began to take off
Rajiv's political popularity went into decline.
Rajiv Gandhi had come to power on a wave of sympathetic
and optimistic popularism. Claiming that "our politics should
& Deepak Tripathi, "India's Foreign Policy: the Rajiv Factor,"
The World Today July 1988: 112.
67 Wolpert 423.
58
be clean," Rajiv was perceived by the masses to be
uncontaminated by the institutionalized corruption that
embodied Indian politics. 68 His squeaky clean character was
soon tainted in successive domestic aspersions. Rajiv had
pledged democratic reforms for the Congress Party, but failed
to hold internal party elections as promised. 6" He also
dismissed his finance minister, V.P. Singh, because Singh
allegedly dug to deep into a kickback scandal involving a $1.4
billion dollar defense contract with Bofors, a Swedish
armaments firm. Singh's investigation had churned up evidence
which implicated the brother of a close personal friend of the
Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Gandhi continued his campaign to improve
India's relations with its smaller neighbors, Western Europe,
Japan, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union even
though he faced serious political difficulties at home. He
maintained a high international profile and achieved
significant success in bilateral relations with a myriad of
countries
.
For example, in 1984, after only a month in office, U.S.
and Indian negotiators signed a memorandum of understanding
concerning high technology transfers between the two
countries. Rajiv followed this up with an official visit to




excellent impression on his American hosts." 70 Only a month
before arriving in Washington Rajiv had befriended Mikhail
Gorbachev during a visit to Moscow in which India's special
relationship with the Soviet Union was reaffirmed by the
signing of two economic agreements which called for continued
Indo-Soviet cooperation until the year 2000. That same year
Prime Minister Gandhi also signed an agreement with Pakistan's
General Zia which was hailed as a break through. The
agreement proclaimed that in the advent of war neither state
would conduct a first strike on the other's nuclear
facilities
.
Rajiv's push for multilateral relations between India and
her smaller neighbors culminated in the creation of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985.
SAARC was envisioned as an organization that would seek
solutions to the complex problems facing South Asia. It was
hoped that this association would develop into a South Asian
version of the Organization of American States or possibly
even an entity resembling the European Union. Doomed from its
inception, SAARC never achieved any of its grandiose designs
and was reduced to little more than a forum for cultural
exchange. This was due in part to its charter which
stipulated that "bilateral and contentious issues will be
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In 1987 Prime Minister Gandhi sent several thousand
Indian troops to Sri Lanka to assist in counter- insurgency
operations against the rebel forces of the Tamil Tigers. In
a situation akin to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, troop
strength soon escalated to 50,000 but remained largely-
ineffective against the stubborn Tamil rebels. Then in 1988
Rajiv once again sent Indian troops abroad, this time to
suppress a coup in the Maldives, one thousand miles south of
India
.
To the surprise of the Gandhi Administration both
operations won support from the United States. To the members
of SAARC, however, these operations confirmed India's regional
military supremacy and willingness to project power through
out South Asia.
In the end Rajiv's domestic difficulties overwhelmed any
gains he might have made in either economic modernization or
foreign policy. In 1989 with Indian troops still bogged down
in Sri Lanka and trouble brewing in Kashmir, Rajiv faced
national elections. Rajiv's well-intentioned but
"Quaylesque" image generated difficulty for the Congress (I)
Party at the polls. Losing more than half its seats in the
Lok Sabha, Gandhi was ousted and a minority government under
the leadership of V.P. Singh, Rajiv's former defense and
finance minister, assumed control of the government.
During his five years in office, Rajiv had exercised
India's regional hegemony and enhanced external economic
61
relations in pursuit of modernization. He also further
irritated India's deep seated communal tensions by trying to
expand the control of Congress (I), ergo, fueling the rise of
the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party a.k.a Hindu nationalist
party). While staging a political comeback in 1991 Rajiv
Gandhi was assassinated by a suspected Tamil terrorist.
Like his mother before him, Rajiv's murder was an
indirect result of his political policies. His death left
Congress (I) leaderless. Many in the party wanted his Italian
born widow, Sonia, to succeed her slain husband. When she
declined the offer, Congress (I) leadership defaulted to P.V.
Narasimha Rao, Gandhi's 69 year old Minister of External
Affairs
.
Prior to Prime Minster Rao, India had been governed by
two consecutive weak, coalition governments. V.P. Singh's
Janata Dal Party minority government collapsed after less than
a year in office due to political infighting. Chandra Shekar
and 62 other defectors broke away from Singh's coalition and
joined forces with Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) Party and its
allies. This gave Shekar a controlling share of Parliament's
512 seats but only at the mercy of Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi had
only backed Shekar in order to splinter support for V.P.
Singh. He was scheming to unseat Shekar when he was murdered
by a suicide bomber. 72
7: The Economist 9 March 1991: 20, 31-32, and Newsweek 3 June
1991: 28-32.
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Throughout the 1970s and 1980s India's relative regional
power continued to rise despite its myriad of internal
problems. Under Indira Gandhi's leadership India fought and
won a war with Pakistan, became a nuclear power, and built a
potent military force.
In the mid-1980s Rajiv Gandhi flexed India's military
muscles in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, demonstrating New
Delhi's willingness and capability to project power throughout
the Indian Ocean region. He also initiated some economic
reforms, and improved relations with Europe, the United
States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China, which also
contributed positively to India's international status.
India entered the 1990s as South Asia's unchallenged
regional master. Although India continued to face immense
social, political, and economic challenges, its intrinsic





V. 199 0-1994: BEYOND SOCIALISM AND THE SOVIET UNION
The confusion and chaos of the Indian government in the
wake of the Nehru dynasty paralleled the disorder of the post-
Cold War World. Early in 1990 the United States and its
allies crushed Iraq with a dazzling display of high tech
weaponry. While the Gulf War forced India to acknowledge the
preeminent military power of the United States, the
disintegration of the Soviet Union cast the subcontinent
adrift, in search of moorings in a new world order. 73
The demise of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of
India's fourth phase of modern development. The collapse of
the Soviet economy meant the end of India's preferential trade
agreements. As India's economy loomed on the verge of
collapse Prime Minister Rao's pledge to initiate economic
reforms held great promise. As the new economic programs
began to take shape, old wounds from India's past threatened
to undermine any potential successes. Hindu communalism,
disintegrating Indo- Pakistani relations, and an outbreak of
the pneumonic plaque were just some of the events that put the
brakes on any immediate Indian hopes for joining the elite
clique of First World powers.
India was not alone in its struggle to make sense of the
disorder of the post-Cold War World. The United States was
Thomas P. Thornton "India Adrift: The Search for Moorings
in a New World Order," Asian Survey vol xxxiii no. 12, December
1992, 1063-77.
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also reassessing its policy options and strategies for coping
in the new, unpredictable political era it helped create.
While Indo-American relations appeared to improve, India
remained a low priority in U.S. foreign policy.
A. INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: FROM COMRADES TO COMPANIONS
Contrary to the proclamations of U.S. cold warriors, the
nature of the Indo- Soviet relationship was never founded on
ideological similarities but rather on " [g] eopolitical
considerations, power politics, and pragmatism". 74 Although
Nehru had been impressed with the Soviet Union's rapid
industrialization and centrally planned economy, he disagreed
completely with Marxist -Leninist ideology.
Many of independent India's national interests coincided
with those of the Soviet Union. India felt that it deserved
to be recognized as the major regional power in South Asia.
It wanted to strengthen its military forces to deter Pakistan
and China. India also wanted to prevent further U.S. military
expansion in the region. As the Cold War evolved India quite
naturally leaned toward its most powerful neighbor, the Soviet
Union.
Indo- Soviet friendship was formally ordained under the
reign of Indira Gandhi. In 1971 India and the Soviet Union
4 W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl , Moscow and
the Third World under Gorbachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990)
10 5.
66
signed a twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation. The treaty fell short of an actual mutual
alliance, but not in the eyes of Western cold warriors.
By signing the treaty Moscow pledged to serve as the
guardian of India's interests in international forums;
promised the Indian government sweet deals on Soviet military
hardware; and made generous trade concessions in New Delhi's
favor. In return India was asked only to lend Moscow its
moral support from time to time. 75 The actual Soviet motives
behind this seemingly one way relationship were threefold: 1)
to ensure its own territorial security; 2) to contain U.S. and
Chinese influence in South Asia; and 3) to advance its
interests in the Third World, specifically the non-aligned
countries . 76
The Indo- Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and
Cooperation induced a lasting, symbiotic relationship between
two of Asia's largest, multi-ethnic states. India reaped
great benefits from "the most enduring and trusting friendship
enjoyed by the Soviet Union with any country outside the
Soviet Bloc." 77 Contrary to the spirit of non-alignment,
however, India became dependent on Soviet armaments for its
security. The Indian government, realizing this dependence,
A clear illustration of this moral support was the Indian
government's failure to condemn the Soviet invasion and occupation
of Afghanistan.
76 Duncan and Ekedahl 105.
Bradnock 105.
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sought alternative indigenous and Western sources for its
weapons procurement, nonetheless, by the 1990s defense
production was still 75% Soviet based. 78
In the mid- 1980 's Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking and
rapprochement with the West, caused concern for India. New
Delhi was outwardly supportive of Gorbachev's broad
international themes of global cooperation, interdependence,
and the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. The Soviet
pullout from Afghanistan combined with improved relations with
China, the United States, and Pakistan signalled the end of
India's exalted status in Soviet foreign policy.
Soviet backing had empowered India's political
flexibility in South Asia. Declining Soviet support would
mean India would have to fly solo in the region. As Mr. Mark
Tulley points out, true Indian leadership in South Asia
without Soviet support presented more disadvantages than
advantages. 7^ In the face of flaccid Soviet support, India
accelerated its bid to improve relations with its smaller
neighbors, China, and the West. Rajiv Gandhi's SAARC
initiative, renewed Sino- Indian border talks, and an overall
strengthening of U.S. -Indian relations resulted from the
altered dynamics between India and the Soviet Union.
Mark Tulley, "India and the Developments in the Soviet
Union," Asian Affairs vol. xxiii, part II, June 1992: 146.
7q Tulley 144.
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While India was slowly reorienting its economic and
foreign policies to be more harmonious with the global ground
swell of interdependency and cooperation, the Soviet Union
suddenly imploded. Through out the latter half of the 1980s
rust spots in the Iron Curtain had exposed the decaying frame
of the Soviet monolith to the powerful forces of democracy,
nationalism, and the free market. India watched in horror as
chunks of the multi- ethnic empire of the former Soviet Union
splintered off and or dissolved into bloody ethno-nationalist
conflicts
.
The collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on
India. In fact, as Professor Raju G.C. Thomas rightly points
OUt :
[t]he disintegration of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War has been the single
most important external cause of change in
South Asia. 80
Economically strapped, Russia now demanded hard currency for
its military hardware. The generous barter agreements for
general trade and commerce also came to an end, causing a
major crisis for the already stagnant Indian economy. By 1991
the severity of the economic situation had forced India's
Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh to declare, "we have not
experienced anything similar [regarding the depth of India's
economic crisis] in the history of independent India." 81
8u Raju G.C. Thomas, "South Asian Security in the 199 0' s,"
Adelphi paper 278 July 1993: 5.
81 Ramashray Roy, "India in 1992," Asian Survey vol. xxxiii,
no. 2, February 1993: 120.
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The financial tragedy of Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) clearly demonstrated what the future
would hold for India if drastic economic reforms were not
implemented quickly. In addition to its economic collapse,
the breakdown of Soviet central authority led to increased
ethnic, separatist, and criminal violence. Bloody conflicts
erupted almost immediately in South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh,
and Moldova. In all, twenty actual or potential flashpoints
threatened the security of not only Russia, but Central and
South Asia as well. 82
In summary the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated
India's integration into the global economy. India's domestic
economic reforms were based on expanding foreign investment
and global trade, which required better relations with China,
Japan, ASEAN, and the West. As India increased its trade and
relations with these states it also worked to maintain close
links with Russia and the CIS.
Russia's continued cooperation and friendship, although
altered by the end of the Cold War, were still seen as
critical for many reasons. The Indian defense establishment,
which was in the process of diversifying and indigenizing its
procurement of weapon systems and armaments, still remained
largely dependent on the former Soviet Union. Although Russia
and India were seeking "good neighborly" relations with China,
8: Taken from a chart entitled "Ethnic/Territorial Flashpoints
in the Former Soviet Union" produced by the United States Army
Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Washington D.C.
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both realized that traditional animosities (e.g. over border
disputes) remained and could flair up in the future.
Russian and Indian economic interests also continued to
converge in the post Cold War era. Both nations were forced
to initiate major macroeconomic reforms, which it was hoped
would raise the overall standard of living, increase GNP, and
lead to steady long term growth.
For India the most frightening aspect of the collapse of
the Soviet Union was the wave of ethno-nationalist conflicts
that broke out in the former Soviet republics. If the central
Indian government were to disintegrate in a similar fashion it
was feared India would be awash in blood, as violent tribal,
communal, and ethnic conflicts were already a fact of life in
Assam, the Punjab, and Kashmir.
While the survival of Russia's fragile parliamentary
democracy serves as the basis for amicable, long term U.S.-
Russo relations, this is not the case with India. India's
relationship with Russia is and has been based on geopolitical
realities
.
From the mid-1950s through the 1980s India's status in
Soviet foreign policy was heightened due to the charged
ideological environment of the Cold War. When the Soviet
Union collapsed India lost its privileged position in Russian
strategic policy, nevertheless, the two maintained a close
rapport. This close association will endure major shifts in
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ideology and forms of government as long as both India and
Russia's national interests continue to converge.
B. THE RISE OF COMMUNALISM: THE INCIDENT AT AYODHYA
The greatest threat to communal peace in India
today is the communal izat ion of politics. 83
On 6 December 1992 in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, Babri
Masjid, a mosque constructed during the reign of Emperor Babar
of the Mogul Dynasty, was demolished by thousands of agitated
members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya
Swayam Sevaks (RSS), two Hindu nationalist organizations
affiliated with the BJP. 84 Hindu zealots claimed that the
mosque had been constructed on the very spot where Lord Ram,
an avatar of the Hindu god Vishnu and the protagonist of the
Sanskrit epic, the Ramayana, had been born. The declared aim
of the VHP and RSS was to erect a temple in honor of Lord Ram
in place of the Babri Masjid.
Right wing Hindu organizations had been gaining public
support throughout the Hindu heartland of Northern India by
skillfully tapping into the growing dissatisfaction and
distrust of the central government. Their leaders painted a
gloomy picture of a passive Hindu India being eroded by the
Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Predatory Commercialization and
Communalism in India" in Sarvepalli Gopal , ed., Anatomy of a
Confrontation: Avodhya and the Rise of Communal Politics in India
(London: Zed Books, 1993) 213.
S4 Sumit Ganguly, "Ethno- religious Conflicts in South Asia,"
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rising tide of Muslim fundamentalism emanating from the oil
rich Middle East and war torn Southwest Asia. Adherents of
this view saw India's large muslim population as a potential
fifth column in some kind of global Islamic conspiracy. 85
Since the mid-1980s the BJP had supported right wing
Hindu groups in their anti -mosque campaign in an effort to
court Hindu votes. Their election logic was based on the
simple fact that India's population was 80% Hindu. Therefore,
by stoking religious and nationalist sentiments L.K. Advani
and other BJP leaders hoped to capture a majority of the seats
in parliament and depose the ruling Congress (I)
.
The construction of a temple .to Lord Ram in Ayodhya
became a pivotal issue in the BJP's political agenda. The
disputed mosque, which had not been used for worship since
1949, had come to symbolize the Indian government's commitment
to secularism and the protection of the Muslim minority. For
Hindu nationalists, however, the mosque represented centuries
of alleged Muslim repression and decades of Congress' (I)
draconian affirmative action plans enacted to win the vote of
the scheduled castes and other minorities at the expense of
the Hindu majority. 86
The destruction of the mosque touched off a wave of
communal violence across India. To many observers inside and
8? Ganguly 104.
Robert D. King, "Incident at Ayodhya," National Review ,
vol.45, no. 5, March 15, 1993: 24.
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outside the country it appeared as though Indian society was
in an inescapable decline. 87 The BJP's attempt to harness the
energy of Hindu -Muslim tensions for its own short term
political benefit backfired; causing negative reverberations
well beyond the subcontinent. Anti- temple riots in Bangladesh
fueled the growth of theocratic political parties there, while
work visas for Indian guest workers in the Persian Gulf were
restricted. 88
While the razing of the Babri Masjid was an "egregious
example of Hindu extremism", the BJP and its allies were not
alone in bearing the responsibility for the entire affair. 89
As Professor James Manor points out:
The simultaneous occurrence over the last two
decades of both a political awakening and
political decay has prepared the ground for
the divergence of society and state. 90
Weakened political institutions and impotent minority
governments were eroding the secular frame work of the Indian
Union. Congress' (I) short sighted goal of maintaining
control of the central government superseded their
responsibility to uphold the ideal of secularism.
Ashutosh Varshney, "The Diminution of India, " India Today
December 31, 1992: 64g.
Sandy Gordon, "Religious fissures widen, " Asia- Pacific
Defence Reporter , 1994 Annual reference ed., 48.
Ved Mehta, "The Mosque and the Temple, " Foreign Affairs ,
vol.72, no. 2, spring 1993: 16.
James Manor, "India: State and Society Diverge," Current
History vol.88, no. 542, December 1989: 430.
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As was expected Prime Minister Rao's leadership during
the crisis was heavily criticized. Congress' (I) weak
position in parliament had necessitated a quasi-alliance with
the BJP. Rao naively accepted the assurances of the BJP
controlled state government of Uttar Pradesh that the mass of
VHP and RSS supporters gathering at Ayodhya were there for a
peaceful demonstration only. The BJP leadership promised the
Prime Minister that it could and would prevent the right wing
Hindu groups (VHP and RSS) from demolishing the Babri mosque.
When he was informed of the mosque's destruction, Rao
declared that, "the demolition of the Ayodhya structure was an
act of utter perfidy." 91 BJP officials claimed they were
unable to control the chanting and shouting throngs of Hindu
fanatics, whose numbers were reported to be in excess of
200,000. The huge mob surged through security lines and
flattened the 400 year old structure in less than 6 hours. 92
In the months following the demolition of the Babri
Mas j id, riots in Bombay alone resulted in nearly 500 deaths.
This tragedy was followed by bomb blasts that rocked the city
killing an additional 400 persons. 93 Coinciding with Indian
press reports that the general public's confidence in the Rao
Zafar Agha, "How did Rao Blunder?," India Today December
31, 1992: 31.
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government had sank to an all time low, the people of India
went to the ballot box. In November, to the surprise of many,
the BJP was soundly defeated in four out of six provincial
elections. The election results, which were interpreted as a
general mandate against the BJP's actions in Ayodhya, granted
Rao and Congress (I) a second chance.
Just as the popularity of Rao began to rebound,
accusations of bribery in connection with a $1.6 billion
dollar stock market scandal were leveled at the Prime Minister
and his Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh. Singh, touted as
one of the most honest men in public service, resigned in
protest. Prime Minister Rao refused to accept Mr. Singh's
resignation and survived the credulous charges. In the midst
of these crises the Rao government managed to push ahead with
its economic reforms which proved to be remarkably successful.
For the time being communal violence and agitation seem
to be held in check, however, underlying tensions still
remain. The destruction of the Babri Mas j id proved to be a
difficult test for India's secular democracy. But as Dr.
Kripa Sridharan, a faculty member of the Department of
Political Science of the National University of Singapore
notes
:
...what bears emphasis is that Indian
democracy may seem bafflingly chaotic to some
observers but it is in fairly good working
order. Its institutions, though not as robust
76
as before, exhibit a fierce capacity to
survive and are capable of regeneration. 4
Presently, Rao's Congress (I) government remain in power and
the economic reforms are pushing ahead, but foreign investors
still "wonder whether it is safe to invest in a country where
religious passions threaten governments as well as mosques." 95
C. INDO-U.S. RELATIONS: STRATEGIC OPTIONS AND THE POLICIES
OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
In recent years South Asian experts and scholars have put
forth many new and improved strategic options for the United
States with regard to India. For example, during the last
quarter of the Bush Administration Mr. Selig S. Harrison, a
senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, concluded that:
The United States now has an opportunity for a
fresh start in South Asia and should move
toward a more detached policy that avoids
embroilment in the region's military rivalry
while giving appropriate emphasis to India as
South Asia's more important power."6
Mr. Harrison also listed seven clear guidelines for U.S.
foreign policy vis-a-vis India:
Kripa Sridharan, "India's transition to cautious optimism,"
Business Times
, (published by Singapore Press Holdings Ltd.),
Weekend Edition, September 24-25, 1994: I.
"Testing India's Structure," The Economist December 12,
1992: 41.
Selig S. Harrison, "South Asia and the United States: A
Chance for a Fresh Start," Current History vol.91, no. 563, March
z o 2 • 97
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1. Avoid involvement in the Indo- Pakistani military
rivalry
2. Enlarge multi- lateral economic support
3
.
Condition aid on economic reforms
4 Promote a regional rapprochement
5. Support Indian membership in the U.N. Security
Council
6 Give India and China equal treatment
7. Encourage nuclear restraint/7
Before implementing these guidelines Mr. Harrison suggested
that the United States first adopt a more detached military
posture, and reassess its position on the nuclear issues
facing the region.
In April of 1992 the National Defense University's
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) co-hosted the
third Indo-U.S. Strategic Symposium in conjunction with
India's Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
.
For three days Indian and American scholars and policy experts
exchanged views and ideas concerning the future of Indo-U.S.
relations in the post Cold War era. At this symposium
Professor Stephen Cohen presented a paper entitled, "India's
Role in the New Global Order: An American Perspective." In it
he listed five possible strategic alternatives for dealing
with India:
1. Sheer Apathy : Let India reach its own natural
strategic balance by disengaging and doing nothing.
Harrison 104-5.
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2. Containment : Enact a strategy similar to that used
against the former Soviet Union to prevent India from
conflicting with U.S. interests in the area.
3. Appeasement : Recognize India as the regional hegemon
and support- -or at least not strongly oppose- - Indian ambitions
in the region.
4. Alliance : Obligate to formal agreements with India in
pursuit of U.S. interests.
5. Cooption : Blend elements of containment, appeasement,
and alliance strategies in order to offer a combination of
inducements and pressure to advance U.S. interests in India. Q8
Professor Cohen surmised that cooption was the most
sensible of the five strategies outlined. He went on to
describe how this strategy of "tough cooperation" could be
structured in order to advance important U.S. interests in
South Asia, such as non-proliferation and war- avoidance
.
In more recent articles and conferences Professor Cohen
has expanded his cooption concept by proposing the creation of
a South Asian Regional Initiative (SARI)
,
Q9 According to Mr.
Cohen, SARI should be based on the premise that the United
States has no vital national interests at stake in South Asia
worth going to war over. Therefore, in order to pursue such
continuing U.S. interests as democracy, non-proliferation,
economic liberalization, and the like, a new strategic
Stephen Philip Cohen, "India's Role in the New Global
Order: an American Perspective," The United States and India in the
Post-Soviet World, Proceedings of the Third Indo-U.S. Strategic
Symposium (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1993) 63-
6.
Stephen Philip Cohen, "The United States and India: Nuclear
Policy, Arms Control and Military Cooperation" prepared for a
conference on "India and America After the Cold War", 7-9 March
1993: 8.
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framework is needed. Professor Cohen explained that this new
policy structure should be modelled on the Middle East peace
process, with the central objective of first normalizing Indo-
Pakistani relations. According to Mr. Cohen, time and high
level attention would be the primary U.S. assets necessary for
this strategy to succeed. 100
Yet another view on U.S. options in South Asia is offered
by Mr. Lawrence E. Grinter in an article entitled "The United
States and South Asia: New Challenges, New Opportunities"
which appeared in the summer 1993 edition of Asian Affairs .
In this article, as in Professor Cohen's, Mr. Grinter also
concludes that the U.S. has no vital interests in South Asia,
but he goes on to add that:
the area [South Asia] has begun to loom larger
in American perspectives in part because the
end of the cold war is allowing India and the
United States to develop a more natural
relationship with market economics as a
focus. 101
Mr. Grinter then lists five systematic criteria for
evaluating future U.S. policy options for South Asia:
1. American initiatives in South Asia must not encourage
arms races, or prompt unilateral military buildups.
2. The United States should gear proposed policies to
enhance access and/or influence in the area.
Stephen P. Cohen, "A Fresh U.S. Policy for South Asia,"
India Abroad
. April 2, 1993: 2-3.
Lawrence E. Grinter, "The United States and South Asia:




Such proposals should promote and encourage
democracy
.
4. All U.S. South Asian initiatives should ultimately
stimulate market economics.
5. U.S. policies should be aimed at lowering the
hostility levels in the region and encouraging the peaceful
settlement of issues. 102
In addition to these five systematic criteria, Mr. Grinter
also creates three pessimistic, future scenarios for South
Asia :
1. Another India- Pakistan war
2. Disintegration of Afghanistan, or the rise of a
radical islamic regime in Kabul
3. Rupture of the United States- Pakistan relationship.
From these he concludes there are three general strategies for
the United States with regard to South Asia: 1) Downgrade
Pakistan; 2) Upgrade India; or 3) use a region wide
approach. 10 ' He fleshes out this structural skeleton by
designing and/or endorsing specific policies (e.g. the
creation of a South Asia working group between U.S. CENTCOM
and PACOM, and the Clinton Administration's adoption of
President Bush's proposal for a five-power conference on
nuclear-free South Asia).
Mr. Harrison, Mr. Cohen, and Mr. Grinter all present
long term strategies for the improvement of U.S. foreign
policy with regard to India. All three of the aforementioned
102 Grinter 112-13.
"'- Grinter 113-15.
strategies require assets which succeeding U.S.
administrations have been unwilling to devote to the region:
time and attention.
President Clinton, who was elected largely due to the
popularity of his proposed domestic agenda, initially was
disinterested in the formulation of foreign policy.
Accordingly, South Asia, which was already low on the foreign
policy totem pole, became even less important in U.S.
strategic planning.
Early in 1994 the Clinton Administration inadvertently
angered the Indian government with a series of statements on
the sensitive issue of Kashmir. 104 Assistant Secretary of
State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel, an Oxford
classmate of the President, was sent to New Delhi to rectify
the situation. Ms. Raphel calmed Indian officials by
articulating a clear U.S. position on Kashmir, which called
for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue in
accordance with the 1972 Indo- Pakistani Simla Accord. The
statement also petitioned for a reduction in human rights
violations and opposition to any outside aid for Kashmiri
militants . i05
With the matter of Kashmir out of the limelight and
economic ties growing between the United States and India, Ms.
ICM John F. Burns, "White House Statements on Kashmir Rights
Anger Indians," New York Times 10 March 1994.
Iu5 K.K. Katyal, "Raphel Outlines 5-Point Approach on Kashmir,"
The Hindu 02 April 1994.
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Raphel and her colleagues focused their attention on the issue
of counterproliferation in South Asia. The Clinton
Administration attempted a carrot and stick approach with
Pakistan on the issue. By dangling the transfer of 38 F-16
aircraft (worth an estimated $658 million) in front of Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, Washington offered weapons that would
bolster Pakistan's conventional security in return for a
verifiable cap on its nuclear weapons program. 106
Indian officials were alarmed by the possible transfer of
F-16s to Pakistan and the simultaneous increase of pressure on
India to come to the nuclear bargaining table. The Clinton
Administration wanted India to join a proposed nine-nation
summit to denuclearize the subcontinent. Some Indian experts
read U.S. initiatives to cap nuclear proliferation on the
subcontinent as an attempt to weaken and eventually destroy
Indian nuclear capabilities. 107
To smooth out relations, eliminate misunderstandings, and
perhaps boost India's sagging pride, the Clinton
Administration invited Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao to visit
Washington D.C. in the spring of 1994. Prime Minister Rao
gladly accepted and arrived in the United States in May.
After delivering a moving speech before a joint session
of Congress, Prime Minister Rao met with President Clinton the
100 Raj Chengappa, "Nuclear Dilemma, " India Today 3 April
1994: 48.
107 Chengappa 5 3 .
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following day at the White House. Their meeting was described
as "friendly and fruitful" and a "good beginning", but the
shortage of press coverage in the United States reflected the
overall low priority of India in U.S. strategic circles. 108
President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao later issued a
joint statement in which they agreed on several broad issues:
1. A new partnership should be formed between the U.S.
and India.
2. Democracy, respect for human rights, and economic
liberalization provide the best foundation for global
stability and prosperity in the post-Cold War world. India
and the United States would cooperate to solve the problems
posed by weapons of mass destruction, AIDS, environmental
degradation, population growth, poverty, international
terrorism, and trafficking of illegal narcotics.
3
.
Expanding the pace and scope of high level exchanges
concerning political, economic, commercial, scientific,
technological, and social issues.
4. Increasing Indo-American cooperation at the United
Nations
.
5. The need for bilateral negotiations between India and
Pakistan (as per the Simla Accords) in order to resolve all
outstanding differences, specifically the issue of Kashmir.
6. Strong support to reduce and progressively eliminate
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
7. Intensification of cooperative efforts to achieve a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
8. The removal of impediments that exist in Indo-
American bilateral commerce in order to further stimulate
trade and investment.
9. Satisfaction with the ongoing U.S. and Indian
scientific exchange programs, cooperation on a new science and
Quoted from press reports carried in L.A. India Journal 27
May 1994. (This publication is an English language, weekly
newspaper for Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans
residing in the Los Angeles metro region.)
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technology agreement, and the signing of two agreements on
drug awareness and the preservation of cultural heritage
sites
.
The Clinton-Rao joint statement reflects the convergence
of Indo- American national interests in the wake of the Cold
War. Although President Clinton and Prime Minister Rao
appeared to be in harmony on these broad issues many
substantive disagreements remain. One major point of
contention is the United States' commitment to the capping,
reduction, and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems in South Asia. 110 This policy is
central to the President's national security strategy of
engagement and enlargement. According to the White House's
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement :
South Asia has seen the spread of democracy,
and our strategy is designed to help the
peoples of that region enjoy the fruits of
democracy and greater stability through
efforts aimed at resolving long-standing
conflict and implementing confidence building
measures. This advances U.S. interest in
halting nuclear and ballistic missile
proliferation. The United States has engaged
India and Pakistan in seeking agreement on
steps to cap, reduce and ultimately eliminate
their weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile capabilities. 111
I0q
"Rao- -Clinton Joint Statement," L.A. India Journal 27 May
1994: 113 and 120.
110 Taken from the Clinton Administration's report to Congress,
entitled "Update on Progress Toward Regional Nonproliferation in
South Asia," April 1994.
William J. Clinton, President, United States, A National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
,
(The White House:
U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994) 26. (emphasis added).
India interprets President Clinton's plan to cap, roll
back, and eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as
hypocritical and discriminatory. One Indian strategist
summarized that:
They [the United States and its Western
allies] would like to prevent any other nation
from joining their exclusive club as
proliferation of WMD is a cause of concern but
would like to hold on to their own arsenals:
WMD in their hands are acceptable. Selective
regional disarmament and not global riddance
of WMD would appear to be their objective. u:
This reasoning and logic is also cited in defense of India's
refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
,
which is also viewed as discriminatory.
The Clinton Administration's support of continued
bilateral discussions, high level visits, and confidence
building measures will enhance relations between India and the
United States in the future. While the overall improvement of
diplomatic and commercial ties between the United States and
India is a notable foreign policy achievement, some Asia
specialists, such as Harry Harding, wonder if "the
Administration's apparent accomplishments in Asia were more
the result of good fortune than of careful planning." 3
President Clinton could build on the present Indo-
American "good fortune" by adopting one or a combination of
Lt
. Gen. A.M. Vohra, (ret.), "Indo-Pak Divide and South
Asian Cooperation," Indian Defence Review vol.9, (3), July 1994:
43 .
Harry Harding, "Asia Policy to the Brink, " Foreign Policy
no. 96, Fall 1994: 57.
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all the long term strategies outlined by Mr. Harrison, Mr.
Cohen, and Mr. Grinter. A more balanced, somewhat detached
but co-opting approach would not detract from President
Clinton's strategy of engagement and enlargement. In fact, a
carefully crafted, long term strategy for South Asia could
achieve the Administration's stated objectives with fewer
resources and in less time.
In addition to President Clinton's stated
counterproliferation objectives for the subcontinent, there
are other important reasons why the United States should
devote more time and energy to developing a strong, positive
relationship with India. For example, encouraging and
supporting India's economic reforms and its intergration with
the Asia- Pacific region would prove to be both economically
and strategically beneficial for the United States. For as
one author suggested:
no one country should be allowed to dominate
Asia Pacific. Another Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere led by any country would be
a disaster. Although Japan is economically
very powerful, it is Greater China, if not
China itself, which could threaten domination.
India has the potential to assist in obviating
such a threat. 114
India could serve as a military counterbalance against any
potential Chinese threat as well as a huge market for American
exports
.
M.S. Dobbs-Higginson, Asia Pacific Its Role in the New
World Disorder (London: Heinemann Ltd., 1994) 205-6.
87
A major shift in U.S. geo-political strategy toward
India, however, is unlikely given the Clinton Administration's
current engagement in Haiti, the Persian Gulf, North Korea,
the never-ending conflict in Bosnia, and a host of other
foreign policy crises which relegate Indo- American relations
and the problems of South Asia to the back burner.
D. THE CURRENT STATE OF INDO- PAKISTANI RELATIONS
The hostility between India and Pakistan dates back to
the creation of the two states in 1947. Then as now, the
focal point of each country's animosities, fears, and
frustrations centered around the partitioned state of Kashmir.
Indo- Pakistani relations have remained strained since the
spring of 1990 when India and Pakistan were on the brink of
war. The most publicized account of this confrontation
appeared in early 1993 in New Yorker magazine. The story,
entitled "On the Nuclear Edge" read like a Tom Clancy novel.
In it the author, Seymour Hersh, recounted the alleged details
of what he called "the most dangerous nuclear confrontation of
the postwar era." 115
While the immediate threat of war on the subcontinent has
subsided for the time being, the sources for tension between
India and Pakistan remain. India continues to accuse Pakistan
115 Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge", The New Yorker 29
March 1993: 56.
of covertly supporting Kashmiri separatists and exporting
terrorism to Kashmir and the Punjab. Pakistani officials
counter by pointing out that the Indian armed forces occupying
Kashmir continue to violate the human rights of the Kashmiri
people
.
The United States and the other great powers with
interests in South Asia (namely Russia and China) have tried
to steer clear of the Kashmir quagmire. The dispute over
Kashmir has also fueled Indo- Pakistani ballistic missile
proliferation. Pakistan's alleged purchase of short range M-
11 ballistic missiles from China and its arsenal of Hatf I and
Hatf II short range missiles (70-120 km) are the raison d'etre
for India's indigenous construction of the Prithvi ballistic
missile. 110 Both states claim that these deadly weapons are
for defensive purposes, but the quest for more technologically
advanced Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could trigger a
destabilizing arms race. The situation is uncomfortably
reminiscent of the nuclear stand off between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the early stages of the Cold War.
Domestic politics in India and Pakistan also contribute
to the tensions between the two states. Both Indian and
Pakistani leaders must take a tough stand on Kashmir and the
related issue of defense in order to succeed at the polls.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , Near
East/South Asia daily report 17 August 1994, "Paper Finds Motive
Behind Bhutto's Missile Proposal, " Navbharat Times in Hindi, 17 Aug
J1994. * (India also produces a longer range ballistic missile
called Agni, which has the capability to reach continental China.)
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One example of this phenomenon occurred recently when
Pakistan's former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, who would like
to unseat the incumbent Benazir Bhutto, declared that Pakistan
possessed nuclear weapons. Western analysts believed that Mr.
Sharif's primary motive behind this claim was to embarrass Ms.




Mr. Sharif's statement also happened to coincide with
revelations of a Pakistani link to the plutonium smuggling
operations broken up by German authorities. 118 This has not
made India optimistic about the future of Indo- Pakistani
relations, thus, raising the level of tension between India
and Pakistan once again.
Shekhar Gupta, "Nawaz Sharif's Bombshell," India Today 15
September 1994: 29.
118 FBIS, Near East/South Asia daily report 22 August 1994,
"Germany Asked to Inform on Plutonium Smuggling Case," Delhi All
India Radio Network, 22 August 1994.
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VI. THE BURDEN OF KASHMIR
Since the days of Nehru, New Delhi has viewed Kashmir as
the linchpin of India's multi-cultural, secular union. Indian
domestic and foreign policies have consistently maintained
that Kashmir must remain an integral part of the country in
order to prevent the "Balkanization" of India. This
unyielding position, however, has linked many of India's
domestic, regional, and international problems to the burden
of Kashmir.
A peaceful resolution of this nagging problem in India's
favor would advance and accelerate its drive toward great
power status, while the economic, military, and political
drain of a fourth Indo- Pakistani war over Kashmir could prove
to be fatal for India's great power aspirations in the twenty-
first century. Because Kashmir represents such a major
impediment to India's great power status, an in depth and
detailed account of this complex issue is necessary.
Understanding the history behind the struggle for Kashmir is
also essential if one is trying to forecast India's role in
the international political structure of the twenty- first
century.
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A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. Basic Geography and Demographics
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is located in the northernmost
region of the Indian subcontinent and is bounded by China and
Chinese controlled Tibet to the north and east, Pakistan to
the west, and India to the south (see Appendix C) . J&K covers
approximately 86,000 square miles of strategic, mostly
mountainous (Himalayas) territory. The region is divided
between Pakistan and India. Indian controlled Kashmir with
its capital at Srinagar includes the Vale of Kashmir, the
mostly Dogra (Hindu) province of Jammu, and the Buddhist
majority area of Ladakh. Indian controlled Kashmir has an
approximate population of six million, the majority being
Muslims. Azad ("free") Kashmir, resource poor and desolate in
comparison with the Indian state of J&K, has a nearly
exclusive Muslim population of 1.5 million. 119
2 . British Rule and its Legacy on Kashmir
The British empire established its foothold on the Indian
subcontinent in the seventeenth century. Great Britain
perfected the practice of divide and rule during its long
reign over South Asia. The British believed that Indian
" q
"Kashmir", Encyclopedia Americana (1985, volume 15) 329-330
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!ty was divided into homogeneous religious communities
which shared common economic, political, and social interests.
They assumed it to be in their best interest to govern the
subcontinent based on this notion. Because of the vast size
of India, however, direct British rule was numerically
impossible. The colonial government, therefore, granted
autonomy to over five hundred princely states after they
recognized the reign of the British Crown. Kashmir would
later become the largest of these autonomous princely states.
After their defeat by the British in 1846, the Sikhs
(then rulers of Kashmir) were forced to sign the Treaty of
Lahore. Unable to pay the war reparations demanded, the Sikhs
were then compelled to cede Kashmir to the British. Later,
under the Treaty of Amritsar, the state of Jammu & Kashmir was
created and Gulab Singh was installed as the first Maharajah
(princely ruler) . Gulab Singh also conquered the Buddhist
area of Ladakh and incorporated it under his rule. Thus began
the century long, hereditary rule of Hindu Maharajahs over a
predominantly Muslim population.
Consecutive victories for the British in World Wars I and
II proved to be economically and politically costly. Great
Britain needed to concentrate on reconstruction of its own
industries, cities, and economy. Loyal Indian subjects to the
crown who fought in Europe returned to the subcontinent with
new ideas about their future. During this period the drive
for Indian independence had been slowly gaining strength.
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Charismatic leadership from Gandhi and Nehru eventually bonded
all segments cf Indian society together in a non-violent push
for independence. Their Congress party platform was founded
on the establishment of a secular democratic, non-aligned
government and united by a common desire to end British
hegemony. The leadership of the Congress party connected the
drive for independence with the belief of a common historical
experience. They postulated that all the indigenous peoples
of British colonial India shared a common history and
possessed enough cross cultural ties to mark them distinctly
as Indians. Nehru, Gandhi and Patel politically mobilized the
masses by focusing on the common goal of forcing the British
out of India. The Congress platform also called for the
establishment of a democratic, secular state.
Gandhi and Nehru were not the only vocal leaders
competing for the hearts and minds of the Indian people.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the All -India Muslim League,
also wanted independence from Great Britain, but his political
appeal was based on a different concept. Jinnah ascended to
power by capitalizing on the British induced tradition of
communalism. India was comprised of two separate nations, one
Hindu and the other Muslim (i.e. Two Nation theory) proclaimed
Jinnah. By accentuating differences and politically
mobilizing along religious lines, Jinnah carved out the
leadership role he desired.
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In the end even the force of Gandhi and Nehru's
leadership was not enough to overcome the entrenched
communal ism of the subcontinent. The British exodus and
partition of India in 1947 resulted in widespread communal
violence, mass migration across the newly created Indo-
Pakistani borders, war between the two newly formed states,
and ultimately the death of millions of ordinary citizens.
While violence and destruction spread throughout the rest
of India during this time frame, Kashmir's ruler Maharajah
Hari Singh waffled about which path to take. The British had
declared that the rulers of the princely states throughout the
subcontinent had three legal options: 1) accede to India, 2)
accede to Pakistan, or 3) remain independent. Although the
ultimate decision was to be left to the ruler, geographic
location with regard to Pakistan and communal constitution of
the population were held to be the essential determinants for
accession to India or Pakistan. Simply put, if a state had a
Muslim majority and a contiguous border with East or West
Pakistan that state should accede to Pakistan.
Although the majority of Kashmiri Muslims, led by the
popular and secular Sheik Abdullah's National Conference,
desired union with India, Maharajah Hari Singh, a Hindu
himself, felt that independence was his only viable option for
maintaining power. Abdullah, a close, personal friend of
Nehru and arch rival of Singh, was sure to replace him upon
Kashmir's accession to India. Accordingly, in an effort to
95
postpone the inevitable, Hari Singh entered the Standstill
Agreements with India and Pakistan on 12 August 1947. These
agreements, suggested and sponsored by the Cabinet Mission,
were designed to cover the transitional period of
partition. i:o
Later that month, the British commander of the
Maharajah's army reported that tribal raids from groups in
Pakistan were wreaking havoc on Kashmiri towns and villages.
A few months later, to make matters worse, Pakistan cut off
supply lines into Kashmir. By late October 1947 the Pushtun
tribal raiders controlled many towns and villages and were
pressing within fifty miles of the Kashmiri capital of
Srinagar
.
Because of the tribal invasion and suspected Pakistani
ties, Hari Singh made a desperate plea for help to the Indian
government. In order to obtain support, the Maharajah was
compelled to sign the Instrument of Accession, which gave
legal claim to the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India on 26
October 1947. i:i Indian troops arrived in Kashmir immediately
and managed to beat back the Pushtun raiders.
120 Damodar R. SarDesai, "The Origins of Kashmir's International
and Legal Status" in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed. , Perspectives on




3 . Independent India and Kashmir
In early 1948 the Indian government lead by Jawaharlal
Nehru took the matter before the United Nations Security
Council. His aim was to gain international support for
Kashmir's accession to India and seek military assistance to
drive out the remaining tribal raiders.
After many accusations and counter accusations from India
and Pakistan, the United Nations Security Council established
the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and passed
numerous resolutions, three of which are significant to the
current stalemate between Pakistan and India:
1) 17 January 1948: both parties should refrain from the
use of force and inform the council immediately of any
material change in the situation;
2) 13 August 1948: after proving Pakistani troop
involvement, UNCIP made any further action on the issue of
Kashmir conditional on Pakistani and Pushtun tribesmen
withdrawal. The three part resolution consisted of:
a) a mutual cease fire and a line of demarcation.
b) a staged withdrawal of forces from the area.
c) talks concerning the future status of Jammu and
Kashmir and the will of its people to determine
that end. (Each part of this resolution was
conditional on the previous part.);
3) 5 January 1949: established that a plebescite be held
to determine the future status of Kashmir following the
compliance of the provisions of the 17 January and 13 August
UNCIP resolutions. 122
Throughout the ongoing negotiations fighting continued
between Pakistan and India over the fate of Kashmir. A line
SarDesai 87-88.
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of control emerged between Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir
and the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. U.N. brokered talks
continually stalled as both sides refused to demilitarize the
occupied areas
.
In 1954 Pakistan joined the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and the South- East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
,
thus, firmly allying itself with the United States against the
rising tide of Soviet dominated communism. India, under
Nehru's Congress government, had declared itself nonaligned
and had hoped to remain neutral in the developing bipolar Cold
War. But by taking no stance and failing to denounce the
Soviet Union, India and the Kashmir issue were largely ignored
by the United States and its Cold War allies.
With Kashmiri Nationalist leader Sheik Abdullah jailed
and any cry for independence squelched, Nehru decided to annex
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. On March 29, 1956 Nehru gave
a famous speech before the Lok Sabha in which he justified the
withdrawal for a Kashmiri plebescite. He based his decision
on three grounds: 1) Pakistan never removed its forces from
occupied (Azad) Kashmir; 2) Kashmir's Constituent Assembly had
approved the merger with the Indian Union and accepted the
Indian Constitution; and 3) Pakistan's security agreements
with the United States had drastically changed the situation
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and reflected Pakistan's desire to seek a military soluti
concerning Kashmir. 123
In the early 1960s India suffered a series of political
setbacks and misfortunes which gave the impression that the
nation was weak. In 1962 war erupted between the People's
Republic of China and India over border disputes. India
suffered a humiliating defeat. In 1963 communal rioting broke
out in Kashmir after a holy relic was stolen from the
Hazratbal Mosque. A year later India's prominent and powerful
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru died. Then in 1965, Pakistani
forces scored a small victory over Indian troops in the swampy
Rann of Kutch. All these events were misperceived as signs of
India's weakness, hesitancy, and vulnerability by Pakistan.
Confident of India's political indecisiveness and its own
American equipped armed forces, Pakistan launched "Operation
Gibraltar." 124 The plan called for Pakistani backed Mujahideen
and commandos to infiltrate the porous line of control between
Azad Kashmir and Indian controlled Kashmir. Once there, it
was believed, that their very presence would create an
uprising. Pakistani troops would then roll in to help the
insurgents. The plan, however, backfired, as Kashmiris
assisted Indian troops in finding the instigators. India also
123 Ashutosh Varshney, "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why
Kashmir Has Been a Problem" in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed. , Perspectives
on Kashmir, The Roots of Conflict in South Asia 215
.
124 Gowher Rizvi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem,
1947-1972" in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, The
Roots of Conflict in South Asia 69-70.
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out maneuvered Pakistani forces, and after twelve days of
fighting, an American arms embargo, and a Soviet brokered
cease fire the hostilities, which neither side could afford,
stopped.
In 1971 fighting erupted again between Pakistan and
India, but the bone of contention this time was East Pakistan
and not Kashmir. Discriminated and disillusioned Bengali
Muslims fought and won secession from Punjabi dominated West
Pakistan and formed the state of Bangladesh. India entered
the war on the side of the Bengali insurgents. Pakistan, once
again, miscalculated the strength of India's armed forces and
suffered a crushing defeat.
Pakistan's leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and India's Indira
Gandhi signed the Simla Accord in the summer of 1972. This
agreement called for the recognition of the cease fire line as
the current line of control between Azad Kashmir and Jammu &
Kashmir, and a promise that neither side would violate this
line with the use of force. The Simla agreement also called
for bilateral resolution to the question of Kashmir.
In 1975 the Indian government reopened dialogue and
negotiations with Kashmir's most celebrated leader, Sheik
Abdullah. Abdullah signed an agreement with India later that
year which stated that Kashmir would be a "constituent unit of
the Union of India" in return for maintaining Kashmiri
autonomy as provided under Article 3 70 of the Indian
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istitution. I25 |; " After further political wheeling and
dealing, Abdullah emerged as Chief Minister of Kashmir.
Abdullah's leadership was eiectorally legitimated in
1977, and continued until his death in 1982 at which time his
son, Farooq, succeeded him. i:7 Farooq's National Conference
party scored a major victory in the 1983 state elections.
Indira Gandhi had personally campaigned against Farooq's
National Conference party in an attempt to strengthen
Congress's power in Kashmir. Mrs Gandhi was trying to
centralize power in the federal government in New Delhi. In
her quest to gain votes for centralization, Indira Gandhi
inflamed underlying communal tensions throughout India. Non-
Congress party state governments were under siege from New
Delhi and Kashmir & Jammu was no exception. Ultimately Farooq
was dismissed and replaced with a more malleable Chief
Minister
.
After the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi, her son, Rajiv
Gandhi, became the Prime Minister of India. In 1986 Rajiv
forged a marriage of convenience with Farooq Abdullah's
Kashmir National Conference party and his own Congress party.
Disillusioned Kashmiris saw this as a sell out and support for
opposition groups began to rise. By 1987 a coalition of
125 Varshney in Perspectives on Kashmir 217-211
126 Article 370 grants Kashmir special status among other Indian
states, the principal axiom being that non-Kashmiris are not
allowed to buy property or settle in Kashmir.
127 Varshney in Perspectives on Kashmir 218.
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Islamic groups known as the Muslim United Front (MUF)
presented a serious challenge to the Conference/Congress
campaign team. Farooq emerged as the winner of the state
elections that year amidst allegations of widespread election
fraud and rigging.
By the beginning of 1988 anti- Farooq riots had given way
to active resistance to the central Indian government.
Kashmiri militant groups supported by and operating out of
Pakistan began a hit and run campaign against the Indian
government and armed forces. Local security forces began
cracking down hard on suspected militants and sympathetic
civilians which further agitated the insurgency. In 1990
after mounting unrest and cyclically escalating violence, the
central government dismissed Farooq' s administration and
placed Jammu & Kashmir directly under rule from New Delhi.
B. IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT
Today after five years of savage fighting the political
issue of Kashmir is no closer to being resolved than it was at
the time of partition. There are more than 500,000 Indian
troops in Kashmir combatting various militant groups, the two
principal bands being the muslim Hizbul Mujahideen and the
secular Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) . A
Kalashnikov culture has taken root in the Vale of Kashmir,
especially among the disillusioned younger generation. The
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brutalities of the occupying Indian armed forces have also
contributed to the cycle of violence by stoking the sentiments
of insurrection.
In India the reaction to the carnage occurring in Kashmir
is emotional and strong. Like Bosnia, Lebanon, Northern
Ireland and so many other places where ethno- religious wars
rage, public opinion demands a quick solution to end the
violence. As the other trouble spots have demonstrated,
unfortunately, a quick solution only temporarily postpones the
bloodshed. In order to achieve a lasting peace the roots of
the hostilities must be identified, discussed, negotiated and
settled upon. Thereafter all parties involved must commit
themselves to a disciplined path that will require patience,
mutual understanding, and a lengthy period of time to
persevere
.
The origins of Kashmir's problems are complex and
intertwined. A colonial past, secular Indian nationalism, the
Two Nation theory, United Nations involvement, the Cold War,
communalism, Kashmiriyat (Kashmiri nationalism), self-
determination, the international demonstration effect,
charismatic leaders (or the lack thereof)
,
an abundance of
weapons, and internal politics are the primary variables which
have shaped Kashmir's history and generated the present day
situation. The road to lasting peace begins by identifying
and understanding these variables.
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The democratic institutions and processes adopted and
constructed by the British educated Indian elite to rule an
independent India were not indigenous to the subcontinent.
India had a long history of hierarchial rule. While the
uneducated and illiterate masses did not have the slightest
notion of what Western democracy meant, others like Muhammad
Ali Jinnah and his Muslim league interpreted the Congress
party's conception of government as a Hindu version of the
British Raj . Jinnah and his supporters pontificated that
Muslims would face discrimination and persecution under a
Hindu dominated government
.
The British found it attractive and cost effective to
control India based on ethno- religious differences. So called
"martial races" such as the Sikhs, Rajputs and Gurkhas were
utilized in the British led colonial army because it was
believed that these peoples had some sort of inborn will to
fight. Maharajahs and Sultans were allowed to rule the
subcontinents five hundred plus princely states as long as
they were loyal to the British Crown.
By emphasizing ethnic and religious differences and
rewarding Anglif ication of the Indian culture, the British
sent mixed signals to the Indian populace. Democracy was
praised while communalism was allowed to flourish and grow.
Democratic institutions and processes, thus, became entwined
with strong communal organizations. This systemic defect
would become a major source of violence and conflict in South
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Asia. The British, as in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and
the Middle East, had unintentionally sown the seeds of future
ethno- religious confrontations
.
As fate would have it Kashmir was caught in the
ideological and political cross fire of the partition of the
subcontinent. According to the Two Nation theory, Kashmir,
because of its Muslim majority should have been incorporated
as an integral part of newly established Pakistan. The
addition of Kashmir to the Indian Union, however, was also
crucial to Nehru's vision of a secular, democratic India.
Hence, both Pakistan and India found themselves locked in a
diametrically opposed struggle for control of the area. These
powerful external forces set the stage for the brutal conflict
that continues today.
Shifting from a regional to an individual level of
analysis, the personalities and motivations of key figures
such as Jinnah, Nehru, and Sheik Abdullah also must be taken
into consideration when studying the problems of Kashmir.
Here are some of their thoughts on the subject of Kashmir:
Nehru: We have always regarded the Kashmir
problem as symbolic for us, as it has far
reaching consequences in India. Kashmir is
symbolic as it illustrates that we are a
secular state . . . i:8
Jinnah: it is a dream that Hindus and Muslims
can ever evolve a common nationality .
They neither intermarry, nor interdine
128 Varshney in Perspectives on Kashmir 202. (The fact that
Prime Minister Nehru had been born and raised in Kashmir may have
also influenced his thinking on the issue.)
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together, and indeed they belong to two
different civilisations which are based mainly
on conflicting ideas . . . i:q
Abdullah: I and my organization never
believed in the formula that Muslims and
Hindus form separate nations. We did not
believe in the two-nation theory, not in
communalism or communalism itself. . . We
believe that religion had no politics. 130
These key leaders held differing beliefs which each used to
justify their positions on Kashmir. Whether they actually
held credence in their own words is questionable, at least in
the case of Jinnah. The fact remains they influenced the
thinking and actions of generations of Indians, Pakistanis,
and Kashmiris to come.
As if regional and individual differences were not
enough, the international dimension must also be considered
when studying the Kashmir issue. Nehru was the first to try
to sway world public opinion in his favor by submitting the
Kashmir problem to the United Nations. Initially Nehru scored
what seemed a moral and legal victory for the incorporation of
Kashmir into the Indian Union. Once tensions were eased and
Pakistani troops pulled back the people of Kashmir would hold
a plebescite to decide their own fate. Later, however, the
issue became a political football in the realpolitik of the
Cold War. Pakistan's security arrangements with the United
States alienated Nehru and compelled him to lean more towards
129 Varshney in Perspectives on Kashmir 199.
130 Varshney in Perspectives on Kashmir 201.
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the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance.
plebescite that would have settled the question of Kashmir was
ver held.
In the wake of the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan a
violent uprising began in Kashmir. Young Kashmiri youth
joined well armed groups of militants, who were led and
trained by former Afghan mujahideen. These groups conducted
ambushes against Indian soldiers and attacked local and
national government officials. In order to combat the
insurgents the Indian army and the local security forces
cracked down hard on suspected militants and in the process
committed a number of atrocities against innocent civilians.
In May of 1989 India Today ran a cover story on Kashmir
entitled "Valley of Tears." Inderjit Badhwar, the author of
the piece, gave an inciteful description of the trials and
tribulations of average Kashmiris. He profiled several youths
who actively supported the insurgency. One such youth, Wazir
Ahmed, as he is known by his nom de guerre, when asked by
Badhwar why he did not work within the system to change things
democratically replied:
We've tried it [democracy] . It doesn't work,
for us, all politicians are fakes, liars,
thieves. We will make sure that the entire
valley boycotts the next election. 131
The article painted a dreary picture of the lives of Kashmir's
numerous youth. In 19 89 approximately 40% of the population
131 Inderjit Badhwar, "Valley of Tears," India Today 31 May
1989: 37.
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of the Kashmir valley was between twenty and thirty years of
age. Of this percentage, roughly one third were
unemployed. 13: As in the Punjab and the Israeli occupied
territories, disillusioned youth turned to violence to vent
their anger and frustration with a system they saw as
undeniably corrupt
.
The uprising of Kashmiri youth is similar to that of the
Palestinian Intifada in many ways. Disillusioned youth,
raised in a hostile and violent climate, bombarded with
political propaganda, and governed by a harsh occupying force
become agitated and release their angst on those they view as
the oppressors. In Kashmir, as in the Israeli occupied
territories, village elders and businessmen secretly applaud
the young rebels, to whom a violent death signifies martyrdom.
World wide coverage of the Palestinian Intifada may have
contributed to the Kashmiri insurgency that began in the late
1980' s. However, it is by no mean the principal cause for the
cycle of violence that continues in Kashmir today. In the
same India Today article, Mr. Badhwar suggested that,
The immediate cause for the anger and
violence- -even Farooq's ministers now readily
admit --is the universal belief, not without
foundation, that the election was rigged. 133
The falsified election was interpreted as a sell out of the




unemployed Muslim males of the valley. The author als^
alluded to the rise of communalism, arms and training supplied
by Pakistan, a similar separatist movement in neighboring
Punjab, and an inept Indian bureaucracy as some of the other
primary factors for the continuance of the violent insurgency.
C. INDIA'S OPTIONS
What are New Delhi's policy options and goals with regard
to Kashmir? More importantly: which policy would best advance
India's national interests and contribute to the quest for
great power status? There have been a multitude of
suggestions from genuine South Asian scholars and arm chair
experts alike on this very subject. The following is a list
of some of India's non-military alternatives concerning the
future status of Kashmir:
1. the secession of the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan;
2. the creation of an independent Kashmir;
3. granting Kashmir more autonomy, but maintaining
it as an integral part of India;
4. permanently dividing the state along the existing line
of control (LOC) between India and Pakistan and
suppressing the insurgents with force (i.e.




changing the demographics of Kashmir by encouraging
Hindu settlements (i.e. abolishing article 370 of the
the Indian Constitution)
;
6. govern Kashmir via some type of joint Indo- Pakistani
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bureaucracy. I34
Based on India's commitment to maintain Kashmir as an
integral part of a secular, democratic republic some of these
aforementioned policy options are null and void. For example,
the current Congress (I) administration could not justify the
session of Kashmir to Pakistan given the current domestic
political climate. It is just as unlikely that Prime Minister
Rao would grant Kashmir its independence after expending so
much Indian blood and treasure trying to suppress the
insurgency there. So where does this leave India?
In 1990 the then governor of Kashmir, Girish Chandra
Saxena, stated that:
I will put it bluntly. Independence is out.
And they [the various separatists groups] have
to come to terms with it. They must realise
it. But having said that, everything else is
open. 135
Governor Saxena' s statement demonstrated India's commitment to
the territorial status quo, however, it left room for some
compromise concerning the status of Kashmir.
The Rao Administration has chosen to suppress the
insurgency in Kashmir via military means. Recent military
operations in Kashmir were reported to have killed 43 persons
134 These policy options are a combination of suggestions taken
from Maj Sudhir Sawant
,
(Retd.) M.P., "India's Option in Jammu and
Kashmir," Indian Defence Review vol.9 (2), April 1994: 39. and Raj
u
G.C. Thomas, "Reflections on the Kashmir Problem" in Perspectives
on Kashmir 30-34.
135 Rajesh Kadian, The Kashmir Tangle (Boulder: Westview Press,
1993) 147.
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-- 29 militants and 14 civilians -- in separate incidents in
a single day. 1 *" These reports have become all too familiar
for the people of Kashmir.
On the regional front the Rao government also remains
committed to solving the matter of Kashmir bilaterally with
Pakistan in accordance with the Simla Accords of 1972. The
Bhutto government, on the other hand, persists in trying to
focus the international spotlight on Kashmir, hoping for world
public opinion to back the Pakistani position. While both
sides continue to wage rhetorical warfare against one another,
the international community repeats its appeal for the
resumption of some sort of dialogue between the feuding South
Asian states.
The violence that exists in Kashmir today evolved over
successive generations and involves intertwined complex
issues. A simple solution is unlikely to be found anytime
soon. The decay of Indian political institutions in Kashmir
led to the "rigged" state elections in 1987. This was the
straw that broke the camel's back for large numbers of
disillusioned, unemployed Kashmiri youths, thus, triggering
the brutal insurgency and counter- insurgency of the last five
years. Like Bosnia, the Israeli -occupied territories, and
other ethno- religious trouble spots throughout the world,
136 FBIS, Near East/South Asia daily report 9 September 1994,
"Home Minister Reviews Kashmir Situation, " Delhi All India Radio
Network, 9 September 1994.
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decisive third party intervention is the best hope for ending
the cycle of violence in the short term.
As the United Nations, which has been involved in Kashmir
since 1947, has failed to resolve the situation, this leaves,
only the European Community, the United States, Russia, and
China with the influence, capacity, and resources to force
India and Pakistan to the negotiating table. None of which
has shown any particular interest in getting directly involved
in the Kashmir conundrum.
Because of the abundance of weapons, overall lack of
international interest, and the internal politics of both
Pakistan and India, it appears as if the status quo of
insurgency and occupation will last into the foreseeable
future. The issue of Kashmir is of vital national importance
to India. The integrity and strength of its secular,
democratic institutions are linked to how the Rao government
handles the issue.
India can not become a true great power until its own
house is in order. Although the territorial status quo seems
to be in India's favor, the long term political, economic, and
social costs of suppressing the Kashmiri militants will impede
India's drive for great power status. India's fervent efforts
to hold on to Kashmir, however, demonstrate the resiliency of
the country's innate political ideals. These ideals, most
notably the maintenance of genuiune multi- ethnic, secular
democracy, will advance India's drive for great power status.
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VII. THE INDIAN NAVY: REGIONAL POWER BY DEFAULT
the Royal Navy had usually been the
largest in the world. . .The salient feature
of the eighty years which followed Trafalgar
was that no other country, or combination of
countries, seriously challenged Britain's
control of the seas. . . the Royal Navy was at
some times probably as powerful as the next





From the mid- eighteenth to the early half of twentieth
century Great Britain was the preeminent great power of the
world. Pax Britannia was made possible courtesy of England's
domination of the high seas. Like the Spanish and Portuguese
empires before it, England demonstrated that seapower could
enable a state to become a great international power.
India learned this lesson the hard way. The Royal Navy
enabled Great Britain to dominate the subcontinent for over
two centuries. As Imperial Spain, Great Britain, and, most
recently, the United States have proven, a strong navy can be
a cornerstone for great power.
K. M. Panikkar once stated, "it is peninsular India
jutting out a thousand miles into the seas which stamps its
name on this warm embayed ocean." 138 Although never
formalized in a strategic document or white paper, yearnings
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New
York: Vintage Books, 1989) 154.
K. M. Panikkar as quoted by Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy,
PVSM, AVSM (Retd.), "The Agony and Ecstasy of India's Oceanic
Heritage," Indian Defence Review vol. 9(1), January 1994: 44.
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to become a great power motivated
expansion in the late 1970's and 1980's.
Soviet Union and the high cost of main-
drove home the realization that what Inc
a medium sized blue water force, which cc
and safeguard the country's expanding n
Despite a sharp decline in ship procurem
modernization, and fiscal outlays the In
South Asia's dominant local seapower.
An analysis of the history, stratec
and overall capabilities of the moder
demonstrate that India's innate desire to
is being exhibited at sea.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although India's climate, physical ge
resources facilitated maritime transport
Indians never developed seafaring aspiratio:
reason for Hindu maritime antipathy has been
religious and cultural traditions of th
Central Asia who conquered the subcontine
The sacred literature of the Aryans, their
and the hierarchial caste system which t
13Q Vice Admiral S.P. Govil, PVSM, AVSM (
Its Shape and Size, " Indian Defence Review v
18 .
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fenous population discouraged seafaring as an honorable
profession.
Post-Vedic Aryan literature specified ocean voyages as a
prohibited act. The prohibition of sea travel was reinforced
by strange Aryan anti- sailing myths. One such myth
hypothesized that there were giant lodestones at the bottom of
the sea. To avoid the magnetic pull of the lodestones and the
sinking of their vessels, Indian ship builders would use only
non-ferrous fasteners. This self imposed engineering
constraint limited the size and seaworthiness of Indian
vessels, inhibiting trans -oceanic voyages. 140
Another impediment to India's maritime development was
the rigidity of the caste system. In order to maintain caste
purity, hence societal status, members of different castes
were discouraged from associating with one another for long
periods of time. The possible financial rewards from extended
periods at sea in small, confined craft did not outweigh the
social costs of violating the self-imposed segregation of the
caste system.
These institutionalized cultural aversions to sea travel
prevented India from realizing the strategic advantages of sea
power. Thus, India's naval ignorance led to centuries of
European domination beginning with the arrival of the
Joel Larus, "India and its Ocean: The Atypical Relationship
Ends" in Robert H. Bruce, ed. , The Modern Indian Navy and the
Indian Ocean (Developments and Implications) (Canberra, Australia
1989) 56-60.
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Portuguese explorer, Vasco Da Gama at Calicut in 1498. in
1608 the British East India Company established its foothold
in South Asia. British dominance of the subcontinent would
continue for three and a half centuries largely due to the
Royal Navy's unparalleled sea power.
B. INDEPENDENT INDIA AND ITS EMBRYONIC NAVY 141
India finally gained its independence in 1947. The crown
jewel of the British Empire was divided into the separate
states of India and Pakistan. Assets of the Royal Indian Navy
stationed throughout the subcontinent were turned over to the
newly created states with India receiving the lion's share of
men and material. India received thirty- two vessels of
various types, a naval facility in Bombay, and approximately
one thousand officers and ten thousand enlisted personnel.
Pakistan received a handful of ships (the largest being a
frigate), four training schools, 180 officers and 3,400
enlisted men
.
u2 In the decade following partition and
independence both navies were unbalanced and completely
dependent on Great Britain for material, training, and
leadership
.
For a summary of important events in India's naval
development see appendix D.
Lome J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security (Berkeley:
California Press, 1967) 116.
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In late 1947, under the direction of Eritish admiralty
and with the approval of the Indian government, the Indian
Navy began a ten year program to expand its capabilities. The
program called for the total Indianization of the Royal Indian
Navy as soon as possible and the additional procurement of two
light aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, eight to nine
destroyers, and some support ships. Although the force was
destined for a defensive role, it was envisioned that, if
necessary, offensive power could be projected well beyond the
coastal regions of the Indian subcontinent. 143
Countering the military might of the Soviet Union was the
driving force behind the British contribution to the
independent Indian Navy. Britain wanted India to have a
competent naval force in order to deter Soviet submarines from
operating in the Indian ocean. British officials also hoped
that the Indian Navy would assume a large portion of the ASW
burden in the 1.0. if the Cold War were to turn hot.
Indian military planners, however, were more concerned
with the immediate continental threat posed by Pakistan and
Communist China. The Indian government, led by Prime Minister
Nehru, championed the non-aligned movement. Under Nehru,
Indian strategy was to remain neutral in the event of any
East -West conflict. The military threat of Pakistan coupled
with Nehru's strategy of non-alignment diverted already
limited funds away from the fledgling Indian Navy.
143 Kavic 117.
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Non-alignment, international cold war politics, the
genuine military threat from Pakistan, and the financial
constraints of Great Britain all acted in concert to squelch
the aspirations of British and Indian naval enthusiasts. The
optimistic ten year program to construct a viable Indian Navy-
dragged on for decades. 144 The Army and Air Force took
priority and the Navy lagged behind in financial outlays,
technological improvement, operational readiness, and
strategic primacy. 145 The Navy continued to be neglected for
the next two and half decades.
C. THE TURNING POINT
In 1971 India fought its third war with neighboring
Pakistan in twenty- four years. The Indian Navy played a
decisive role in the conflict. Naval air power from the
flight deck of the Vikrant, an ex-Hermes class light aircraft
carrier of British origin, disrupted Pakistani lines of
communication and damaged air bases on the ground in East
Pakistan. Indian naval forces successfully blocked the escape
and resupply of 90,000 Pakistani troops in East Pakistan who
144 Total Indianization of the Navy did not occur until 1962
when an Indian flag officer replaced a Royal Navy Captain as Chief
of Naval Aviation.
Ashely J. Tellis, "Securing the Barrack: The Logic,
Structure and Objectives of India's Naval Expansion" (part I),
Naval War College Review , Summer 1990 edition: 78.
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were subsequently taken as prisoners of war. 14" Indian
surface combatants also sank two Pak warships and a merchant
vessel off Karachi, the headquarters of the Pakistani Navy. 147
As the 1971 Indo-Pak war progressed President Richard
Nixon grew fearful that India, which was on friendly terms
with the Soviet Union, would completely destroy Pakistan. The
United States, struggling to contain communism in Vietnam,
could not tolerate the loss of another Cold War ally. 148
As India materialized as the victor in the third Indo-Pak
war, President Nixon tilted U.S. policy towards Pakistan and
sent the Enterprise battle group into the Bay of Bengal as a
tacit show of force. Although the Enterprise battle group did
not directly influence the outcome of the war it did send home
the message to the Indian political and military
establishments that continental India was still vulnerable to
attack from the sea.
Indian command of the seas proved vital in defeating
Pakistan, but was insufficient to contend with a naval
superpower such as the United States. These facts gave
Indian military planners justification to allot the Navy a
146 Capt . Arun Prakash, IN, "A Carrier Force for the Indian
Navy", Naval War College Review , Autumn 1990 edition: 59.
147 Prakash 59.
In 1971 President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger relied heavily on Pakistan's President, Yahya Kahn for
their clandestine attempt to establish relations with the People's
Republic of China.
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larger share of the defense budget in an attempt to modernize
and upgrade the fleet.
The Third Indo-Pak war also led to a closer military
association between India and the Soviet Union. India had
felt vulnerable and threatened by Nixon's gunboat diplomacy in
the Bay of Bengal. The U.S. also continued to support
Pakistan, the foremost antagonist of India. In response the
Indian government stepped up its "peaceful" nuclear program.
It also acquired various armaments from the USSR, becoming
heavily dependent on Soviet technology and hardware to
modernize its naval forces.
D. THE SOVIET CONNECTION AND THE INS CHAKRA
The Indian Navy procured many Soviet ships, planes and
submarines in its effort to modernize. Kashin destroyers, II-
3 8 May maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and Foxtrot and Kilo
diesel submarines became the mainstays of the Indian Naval
force. The Indians became heavily dependent on Soviet
technology and spare parts. The most noteworthy Soviet
contribution to the Indian Navy, however, was the lease of a
Charlie I class, nuclear powered attack submarine in 1988.
Many wondered why India, a non-aligned, third world nation
needed a nuclear powered submarine?
Because of its size, strategic location, ancient culture
and massive population, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime
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minister, sincerely believed that India was destined to be a
great power. Indian military and political leaders recognized
that being a great power in the Western sense translated, in
military terms, to possessing a blue water navy with a nuclear
capability. This logic was reenforced by the USS Enterprise ' s
venture into the Bay of Bengal in 1971. In addition to its
obvious military advantages, the lease of the Charlie I
(renamed INS Chakra by the Indian Navy) was also influenced by
India's desire for great power status.
Another reason for the acquisition of the INS Chakra can
be attributed to India's passion for a self-sufficient,
indigenous naval force. Since its independence the political
elite of India had embraced an economic program of import
substitution. The objective was to transform India into an
autarkic state and insulate the country against foreign
encroachment. Militarily this meant India would have to
develop a technologically advanced, indigenous defense and
armaments industry. The Chakra was, thus, envisioned as a
mobile trainer which would be studied in detail and later
reverse engineered and produced at home.
The Indian lease on the Chakra expired in 1991. The sub
was returned to the Russian port of Valdivostock in January of
that year. 149 Although many glitches were reported, Indian
naval engineers gleaned valuable information from the Chakra
Capt. Richard Sharpe, RN, Jane's Fighting Ships , 95th
edition (London: Jane's Information Group Ltd., 1992) 268.
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and incorporated it in an ongoing research and development
project entitled the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) . The
ATV program called for an Indian designed Pressure Water
Reactor and a submarine hull based on a Russian model. 150
Indian naval planners optimistically hoped to have between
three to six nuclear submarines in operation by the year
200 0. IM
E. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF INDIAN NAVY152
The Indian Navy is an all volunteer force manned by
55,000 officers and personnel. The Navy, like all India's
armed services, is under civilian control from the
democratically elected government in New Delhi. Below the
Chief of Naval Staff, the force is divided into three major
commands: The Western Command headquartered in Bombay, the
Eastern Command located in Vishakapatnam, and the Southern
Command based in Cochin.
The majority of ships, subs, and aircraft operated by the
Indian Navy are of Russian origin. Since the demise of the
Soviet Union, Indian naval planners have been trying to
Capt . Richard Sharpe, RN, Jane's Fighting Ships 96th
edition (London: Jane's Information group Ltd., 1993) 277.
The completion of a single nuclear submarine by the year
2000 would be a tremendous Indian achievement, however, this seems
highly improbable.




sify the fleet with Western technology and equipment in
an effort to stimulate and improve indigenous warship
construction programs. For example, in 1989 India ordered
General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine engines for the
construction of its Godavari class frigates. This
independently produced class of ships integrated Russian and
European weapon systems, an Indian designed hull with an
American propulsion plant. 153
The decision to build two new aircraft carriers in 1989
to replace the aging Viraat and Vikrant is more evidence
supporting India's efforts to idigenize, diversify, and
modernize its fleet. A design study contract was awarded to
a French firm for a 28,000 ton ship similar to the French
Navy's Charles de Gaule but without nuclear propulsion. The
design had to incorporate the limited size of Indian
construction facilities as the ship was to be built in India.
Later naval planners scaled back the project to a 15,000 ton
model based on the Italian carrier, Guiseppe Garibaldi. The
smaller carrier would operate Sea Harriers and helicopters but
would not be capable of supporting conventional (non-VSTOL)
fighter aircraft. 154 These plans appear to have been delayed
due to financial constraints.
153 Ashely Tellis, "Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure
and Objectives of India's Naval Expansion" (part II), Naval War
College Review , Autumn 1990 edition: 39. and Captain F.G.
Satterthwaite, USNR, "Indo-U.S. Navy to Navy Relations", Asia-
Pacific Defense Forum , Winter 1991-1992: 36.
154 Sharpe, Jane's Fighting Ships 95th edition: 61
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Armeies that appear in prominent news magazines
routinely describe the Indian Navy "in troubled waters" and
muddling along at "slow speed ahead." 153 Aging ships, a
decaying infrastructure, and budgetary constraints point to a
medium sized force, developing much slower than Indian naval
planners would like. While the Indian naval inventory
continues to grow numerically, prominent Indian naval
scholars, such as Ashley Tellis, point out that "a large fleet
does not a maritime power make." 156
In 1990 Tellis described the Indian Navy as a Model II
fleet: coalition capable, performing extended sea-lane
defense and peninsular sea control while striving for blue
water capability. He projected that the Indian Navy would not
become a Model III (possess true hemispheric power projection
and extra- continental lift capabilities) navy until the first
quarter of the 21st century. 157 Tellis also points out that
the expanding Indian Navy lacked "a comprehensive rationale
for such a major naval investment program." 158
Western naval experts continuously compare and categorize
contemporary fleets based on the ambiguous term "blue water."
For Tellis, in order for India to achieve a "true blue- water"
155 Sunil Dasgupta, "In Troubled Waters" India Today April 30,
1994: 70-71.; and Hamish McDonald "Slow speed ahead" Far Eastern
Economic Review 10 October 1991: 20-22.
150 Tellis, (part II) 55.
157 Tellis, (part I) 91-4.
158 Tellis, (part I) 78.
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capability India first "must be able, on a continuous basis,
to deploy simultaneously at least three battle groups centered
on large conventional aircraft carriers of 40-50,000 tons
each." 150 When these statements were published in 1990 no
navy in the world, with the exception of the United States,
was capable of achieving this goal. This is still the case
today
.
Perhaps, Mr. Tellis was asserting that if India desired
to control the entire Indian Ocean and truly become a great
power it would have to, at a minimum, match the naval power
that the United States was capable of projecting into the
region. Given the financial and political realities of India
this would be impossible well beyond the first quarter of the
21st century. What then is India's grand naval strategy? How
does it apportion its limited resources to achieve its
regional and strategic objectives?
F. INDIAN NAVAL STRATEGY
The most significant feature of Indian naval strategy is
its ambiguity. Neither the Indian government nor the Navy has
ever issued a comprehensive written naval doctrine. The lack
of an Indian Naval white paper has caused concern and
suspicion, especially from India's small littoral neighbors.
150 Tellis, (part I) 94.
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India's primary national security threat stems from the
continuing internal separatist movements and ethno- religious
conflicts occurring within its borders. In Kashmir, the
Punjab, and Assam the Indian military, principally the Army,
is engaged in counter- insurgency operations.
Indian regional security is also based on a continental
threat and strategy. Deterring a Pakistani incursion into
Kashmir and preventing border clashes with China are the major
concern of the Indian Army and Air Force.
For these reasons and because there is no identified,
immediate naval threat to continental India and its island
possessions, the Indian Navy continues to be the lowest funded
branch of the military services, consistently receiving
between 10% to 13% of the overall defense budget. In 1991,
for example, the Navy received only 11% of the 6.5 Billion
dollar Indian defense budget ($715 , 000 , 000) . I60 While this
figure may seem a paltry sum in terms of annual U.S. defense
spending, it must be emphasized that it is immense relative to
the combined naval budgets of India's impoverished neighbors.
As domestic pressure forces deeper cuts in overall
defense spending, the Navy's budget will be reduced even
further. This is especially painful considering that most of
its aging warships, which were acquired throughout the 1980 's
via generous barter agreements with the former Soviet Union,
160 Proceedings March 1992: 129. (In 1991 the U.S. defense




are in dire need of spare parts and overhaul. With .- issian
defence production at an all time low and no workable system
of payments, maintenance of the Indian fleet will cost more
than ever. 161
Despite shrinking defense budgets and the military's
emphasis on suppressing internal conflicts, the Indian Navy-
has emerged as the dominant naval power homeported in the
Indian Ocean. The Indian government and admiralty have
aspired to the self -proclaimed responsibility of guardian of
the sea lines of communication in the region. Expanding
maritime trade is the umbilical cord of the new and improved
Indian economy. The Navy and newly formed Coast Guard have
also broadened there missions to cover India's 2.2 million
square mile economic exclusion zone. le>:
Yet today India still has no formal, well articulated
overall grand naval strategy. Based on numerous opinions and
assumptions the Indian Navy's primary roles and missions can
be summarized as follows:
1. Deterrence of potential enemies via sea denial.
2
.
To exercise sea control in specified areas of
interest in the Indian Ocean.
101 Russian factories are losing money in the production of
spare parts for ex-Soviet built military hardware in India due to
the rising cost of raw materials, a drop off of Russian production,
and the current system of payments, which requires Russian defence
exporters to buy Indian goods and sell them in Russia.
162 VADM Mihir K. Roy, IN(retired) , "The Indian Navy from the
Bridge", Proceedings March 1990, p. 73
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3. To safeguard national interests in contiguous waters,
EEZ, and island territories.
4. To maintain limited power projection capability.
5. To ensure freedom of navigation and security of Sea
Lanes of Communication (SLOCs)
.
6. Monitor extra regional navies.
Along with these six roles and missions, Indian Naval strategy
seems to be guided by the recurrent themes of a "zone of
peace" (presumably the entire Indian Ocean), non-alignment,
military self-reliance, and the ascent to great power status.
These themes can be disseminated from a myriad of sources
ranging from Indian op-ed pieces to strategic surveys by the
RAND corporation. 163
The lack of any immediate naval threat has prompted
Indian naval planners and strategists to develop what can best
be described as a grand strategy of sea denial. This strategy
furnishes the Navy with an essential role in the strategic
defense of India. Air, surface, and subsurface units would
have to work jointly to secure key choke points leading into
the Indian Ocean from the Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab
el-Mandeb to prevent an enemy from entering within striking
distance of the homeland. 164 This strategy would elevate the
importance of the Navy as compared with the other two
George K. Tanham, "Indian Strategic Thought, An
Interpretive Essay" prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy by RAND R-4207-USDP.
164 G. Jacobs, "Submarine Fleets in Asia", Navy International
January and February 1992: 6.
128
services, thus securing a bigger portion of the overall
defense budget for the Indian admiralty. However, defense by
denial loses some of its allure when one considers that India
has begun an almost irreversible process of full integration
with the world economy. Expanding its Navy based on an
autarkic defense by denial strategy seems inconsistent with
India's economic aspirations (i.e. cheap oil/gas from the
Mideast and unimpeded transoceanic trade)
.
The concept of sea denial also appears to have been a
principal justification for India's large submarine force.
Long range diesel and nuclear submarines have been a high
priority for the Indian Navy. It was widely believed that an
indigenously produced nuclear submarine would not only support
the sea denial mission but also bolster India's overall status
in the international community.
The ability to deter a potential enemy also contributed
to the modernization and expansion of surface, subsurface, and
naval aviation assets. If an enemy force happened to
penetrate the Indian Ocean, one Indian flag officer concluded
that the Navy needed the ability "to give a bloody nose to any
maritime power seeking to violate India's territorial
integrity or attempting to cut India down to size." 165
Many South Asian states were wary of India's ambiguous
naval build up. Neither the Indian government nor the
admiralty ever formalized a comprehensive grand maritime
Roy, Proceedings 74
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strategy based on the notions of sea denial and
deterrence.
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, and the members
of
ASEAN did not view Indian naval expansion as defensive
in
nature. The Indian government's lack of concern for
its
neighbor's worries strained relations in the region. India
threatened its littoral neighbors through its shear size
and
looming presence.
Today the Indian government, led by Prime Minister P.V.
Narasimha Rao, is continuing with its successful economic
reform policies. In an effort to stimulate trade and
improve
relations with its neighbors, India has decreased defense
spending and delayed its naval modernization program.
ie
Productive joint naval exercises and personnel exchanges with
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have eased some of ASEAN'
s
concerns about Indian military intentions.
167
Major economic changes in India will mean a rethinking of
India's vague naval strategy. As India's trans -oceanic
trade
and commerce increases and defense budgets shrink, more
cost
effective means of security will be needed. An Indian
Ocean




Recently warships from the United States, Australia, and
other South and Southeast Asian states (with the exception
of
Ibb This proved to be a convenient policy for India given
the
fiscal constraints of government expenditure.
167 Michael Richardson, "Rapprochement between ASEAN
anc
India," Asia-Pacifir Defence Reporter April -May 1994: 13.
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Pakistan; have conducted joint naval exercises with India.
India's willingness to operate with other navies in the Indian
Ocean is a change from its autarkic practices of the past .
This cooperative shift symbolizes a new direction for India's
pursuit of global power.
G. IS CHINA A THREAT?
Many journalists and scholars inside and outside India
have identified China as a potential naval threat. Economic
and military ties with non-democratic Myanmar (formerly
Burma), the continued occupation of Tibet, and India's 1962
defeat by the PLA (People's Liberation Army) lend credence to
China's legacy as an adversary.
Reports have indicated that the Chinese Navy has assisted
in the construction of several naval facilities in Myanmar.
China has openly transferred millions of dollars worth of arms
and ammunition to the Myanmarese military junta. The naval
facilities in Myanmar' s Coco Islands abut the vulnerable
Indian Andaman island chain. As Chinese ties with Myanmar
continue to develop, rumors about the PLAN (People's
Liberation Army- -Navy) acquiring an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier
caused alarm bells to sound in New Delhi.
Indian suspicions of the PLAN'S intentions are likely to
be fueled by the recent circulation of a controversial Chinese
book entitled Can China Win the Next War , which identified
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"the greatest potential threat" as India. 168 The book,
presumably penned by a high ranking PLAN official, concludes
that although there is little possibility of another war
erupting between China and India tensions and antagonisms will
persist, specifically over the issue of Tibet. The book also
claims that China's primary naval concerns continue to be
exercising its power in the South China Sea and enforcing its
claim to the Spratly Islands.
Southeast Asia is also another region where China and
India could potentially clash. Historically Southeast Asia
has come under the cultural influence of Hindu/Buddhist and
Confucian thought. Today trans-oceanic trade is the life line
of Southeast Asia's booming economies. Fierce economic
competition in the area could lead to a maritime confrontation
between the two Asian giants.
While identifying the Chinese as a potential threat could
justify further Indian naval expansion and modernization, it
would most assuredly invoke a classic security dilemma with an
enemy projected to have the world's largest economy by the
turn of century (based on present rates of growth) . Thus,
formally identifying China as India's primary adversary could
become a self-fulfilling prophecy which would be disastrous
for India in the long run.
For a review of Can China Win the Next War see Ross H.
Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War
Where It Doesn't," Qrbis vol.38, no . 3 , Summer 1994.
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H. THE NAVY'S SYMBOLISM AND SIGNIFICANCE IN INDIA'S QUEST FOR
GREAT POWER STATUS
India wants to be a great and influential global power
but has never come up with a blueprint on how to achieve it.
The enigmatic expansion of the Indian Navy is symbolic of
India's quest for great power status. British colonization,
blue water superpower rivalries, the war/creation of
Bangladesh, and Nixon's sortie of the Enterprise battle group
into the Bay of Bengal drove home the strategic and tactical
importance of a powerful maritime force to officials in New
Delhi.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing throughout the
1980s the Indian Navy grew at a startling rate thanks to
generous military sales arrangements with the Soviet Union.
Like the detonation of its first nuclear device in 1974 and
its leadership of the non-aligned movement, the growth of the
Indian Navy was viewed as another necessary component for
India's development into a true great power.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent
stagnation of the already flat Indian economy prevented the
Navy from developing into a force capable of true hemispheric
power projection. The modern Indian Navy is probably best
characterized as a "green water" fleet. Here "green water"
translates to being able to provide more than mere coastal
defense but mustering far less power projection capability
than a true blue water fleet.
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In the twenty- first century the modernization of the
Indian Navy is likely to continue but at a slower pace than in
recent years. The renovation of the Indian fleet will be
hinged on the prosperity of the reforming Indian economy as
acquisition of European and American technologically advanced
systems and equipment are costly. Therefore, India is likely
to extend the service life of its aging VSTOL carriers as
expensive upgrades to its squadrons of Sea Harriers have
already been planned. Replacements for these antiquated
carriers (Viraat and Vikrant) are unlikely to enter service
before the turn of the century. Indian naval planners and
logisticians will think twice before investing dwindling
resources in the remaining bargain basement weapon systems and
platforms of the former Soviet Union.
The readiness and competency of the Indian Navy has also
been questioned due to its poor material condition and a
general lack of training. Various sources assert that the
Indian fleet is plagued with major problems stemming from
inadequate funding, insufficient stocks of advanced munitions
,
and unreliable supply lines for spare parts. At the height of
India's naval expansion one prominent Indian strategic analyst
concluded that
:
In reality . . .it could be as long as two
decades before the Indian Navy truly could be
considered an important actor on the stage of
the world's oceans. . . A second-hand aircraft
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carrier and an outmoded nuclear submarine do
not make a blue -water navy. 16Q
Although the Indian Navy is currently incapable of
defeating a U.S., Western European, or Japanese fleet of
comparable size, it remains South Asia's most dominant
indigenous maritime force. India's Navy remains a solid
indicator of India's great power aspirations. New Delhi seems
to have come to the realization that it must be an established
regional seapower before trying to become a global one.




VIII. THE INDIAN ECONOMY: UNSHACKLING THE ELEPHANT
To be a Great Power- -by definition, a state
capable of holding its own against any other
nation- -demands a flourishing economic
base .
Paul Kennedy
The Indian economy has to serve as the mode de force if
India is to fulfill its "tryst with destiny" and become a true
global power in the twenty- first century. From 1947 until
1991 Indian bureaucrats tightly controlled every aspect of the
economy. The centrally run Indian economy was committed to a
socialist path where import substitution, subsidized heavy
industries, government directed production targets, highly
restrictive trade barriers, and other autarkic practices
retarded overall growth and reduced productivity.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union caused a financial
crisis for the Indian government. By 1991 India was on the
verge of economic collapse. External and internal pressures
forced Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to initiate major
structural changes in the Indian economy. 171
After three consecutive years of free market, capitalist
reforms the Indian economy appears to have righted itself and
continues to expand. While many economists and investors
predict that India will be the next Asian Tiger, an equal
170 Kennedy 5 39
.
Shubhashis Gangopadhyay , "The Indian Awakening, " SAIS
Review Winter-Spring 1994: 137.
137
number are pessimistic about the future of India's economic
growth. What follows is an objective look at both the
positive and negative aspects of the Indian economy.
A. THE POSITIVES
During their first two years in office, Prime Minister
Rao and the Cambridge educated economist turned Finance
Minister, Manmohan Singh introduced a number of economic
reforms that were heralded in both the international and
Indian business communities. Rao and Singh devalued the rupee
and allowed it to be made partially convertible; abolished
most industrial licenses; encouraged foreign investment;
reduced import tariffs; opened capital markets; decreased
budget deficits; and attempted to raise India's foreign
exchange reserves. 172
In only two years Prime Minister Rao had initiated a
monumental shift in the direction of the Indian economy by
unleashing the forces of comparative advantage and the free
market. His focused and deliberate policy of economic reform
created an optimistic climate for foreign investment in India.
Even once disinterested U.S. companies became "bullish about
India, a country with a well-educated and skilled pool of
172 Charles H. Percy, "South Asia's Take-Off," Foreign Affairs
winter 1992-93, vol.71, no . 5 : 170.
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labour, a British based legal and accounting system, and an
English-speaking business and political community."'
In addition to these favorable business attributes
India's consumer/middle class has been estimated to number 300
million people. 174 The sheer size and potential for growth of
this emerging market earned India the title as "Asia's new
investment jewel" in a recent addition of U.S. News and World
Report . I75
B. THE NEGATIVES
While India may be "Asia's new investment jewel" it is
certainly not without risks. Bureaucratic red tape, poor
infrastructure, communal strife, and many other obstacles to
modernity exist in India today. 176 The deceleration of the
reform process is a testament to India's cumbersome
bureaucracy. Many of India's much needed economic reforms
have gotten stuck because of the individual state governments'
Patrick Harverson, "The Americans are Coming, " Financial
Times 30 March 1994, special segment on investment in India: v.
"India, Towards a Liberalised Economy," Far Eastern
Economic Review 13 January 1994: 38.
Jack Egan, "Asia's new investment jewel," U.S. News and
World Report 22 August 1994: 72.
Stefan Wagstyl, "The obstacles to modernity," Financial
Times
, 30 September 1993: I.
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tendency to spend on the urgent rather than the important. 1
'
A case in point is the huge amount of potential
investment capital lost through state electric subsidies to
farmers. State electricity boards are losing an estimated 50
billion rupees a year because they charge Indian farmers only
.35 rupees per unit of electricity when it costs the state, on
average, 2.5 rupees to produce the same unit. (In three of
India's southern states, electricity is free for all
farmers.) 178 Voters in these rural districts, which make up
70% of the population, tend to elect candidates that maintain
these subsidies. This inefficient practice also prevents the
much needed expansion of India's- power grid, which is
essential for industrial and commercial development.
The problems of government subsidies and special
interests are minor in comparison to India's ethnic and
communal troubles. The rise of the BJP, the incident at
Ayodhya in 1992, and the communal rioting that followed gave
investors just a glimpse of the tip of the iceberg of domestic
tension that remains prevalent throughout South Asia today.
Fears of escalating communal violence could easily transform
India's emerging markets into financial sinkholes.
Government stability and control are vital if the reform
process is to continue. If the pace of economic reform drops
177
"Where India's reforms get stuck," The Economist 22 January
1994: 33.
178
"Where India's Reforms get stuck" 33
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off, precious foreign investment dollars, francs, marks , and
yen will seek out the safer, more profitable emerging Asian
markets in China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Without
continued foreign investment India's economic engine and great
power aspirations will be stuck in neutral.
C. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
As the previous paragraphs have described, India's
economic future hinges on many unpredictable variables.
Despite all these uncertainties, however, economic forecasts
for the twenty- first century indicate that India will be a
major global powerhouse.
For example, a RAND corporation study conducted in 1989
projected that by the year 2010 India's GNP (gross national
product) would be over 1.3 trillion dollars (based on 1986
U.S. dollars), thus, making it the world's seventh largest
economy overall (see Appendix G) . l7P This study, completed
two years before India initiated its economic reforms, reached
this conclusion using a conservative growth rate of
approximately four percent. Other more recent sources, such
as the United Nations Economic and Social Survey of Asia and
the Pacific
, estimate that India's GDP (gross domestic
"Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1950-2010," (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989) prepared for the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, RAND/N-2757 -USDP : 4.
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product) rate of growth will be even higher, averaging 5.4
percent from 1993 through 1995. l8°
These statistics depict what has been described as the
coming boom of the developing world. According to The
Economist , over the next twenty five years the world will
witness the greatest shift in economic might since the late
nineteenth century. 181 India is one of the developing
countries which stands to gain from this boom.
Based on the World Bank's findings, The Economist lists
India as the world's sixth largest economy in 1992, and
projects it to ascend to number four, behind only China, the
United States, and Japan by the year 2020 (see Appendix G) . 182
Even with all its inefficiencies and self imposed
restraints India remains one of the world's top ten economies.
If India carries the current economic reform process to its
logical conclusion it could grow at the rates experienced by
its successful East Asian neighbors. According to the World
Bank, in order for this to occur India must intensify its
"efforts to strengthen public finances, improve
180 Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 1993
(New York: United Nations, 1993) 17.
181
"War of the worlds," The Economist (A Survey of the Global
Economy) 1 October 1994: 1.
182
"War of the Worlds," 2.
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infrastructure, and enable private investment to flow into key
ias of the economy." 133
Although the economic reform process launched by the Rao
government appears to have slowed down, it has not died. The
momentum of its early successes seems to be enough to carry it
through the morass of Indian domestic politics. While some
potential investors flinched following the wave of communal
violence in the wake of the Ayodhya incident, Prime Minister
Rao and Finance Minister Singh remain optimistic about India's
economic potential.
Will the Indian economy take off? Will the reform
process get bogged down? Time will only tell. All
indicators, however, point to continued growth and expansion,
which puts India on the threshold of achieving great power
status
.
"India: Recent Economic Developments and Prospects, " report




The principal aim of this thesis is to illustrate why
India should be an integral part of U.S. strategic thinking in
the twenty- first century. Chapters II through V analyze
India's modern history, keying on the salient domestic,
regional, and international events that promoted or inhibited
India's great power aspirations. Chapters VI through VIII
provide a more detailed account of three key elements
(Kashmir, the Indian Navy, and the economy) that will effect
India's ascent to great power status.
Based on the analysis and data of this thesis, it is this
author's belief that the United States should recognize India
as an established regional power with the potential to become
a great power during the twenty- first century . This being the
case, the United States, therefore, should reassess and adjust
its foreign policy priorities to reflect this reality.
As Mr. Selig Harrison noted in 1992:
Indian great power ambitions are rooted in a
self-image as one of the world's oldest and
largest civilizations, entitled to global
status second to none and to a regional sphere
of influence centered in, but not necessarily
restricted to, South Asia and the western
Indian Ocean and its island states. 184
Throughout the forty plus years of the Cold War India was
largely ignored by U.S. strategists and government officials.
Even now as the United States re- tools its Eurocentric grand
184 Harrison 99.
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strategy to accommodate the expanding economic importance of
Asia, India is still being overlooked as a potential great
power
.
India achieved regional dominance following the Third
Indo- Pakistani War in 1971. India's military power projection
capabilities greatly increased over the next two decades as
was demonstrated by the significant expansion of the Indian
Navy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and New Delhi's
ensuing financial crisis forced a restructuring of the Indian
economy. If the current economic reform process is carried
out to its logical end, India will have the economic base
necessary for true great power status during the first half of
the twenty- first century.
In summary, six general conclusions can be deduced from
the evidence provided in this thesis:
1. India has and will maintain intrinsic great power
aspirations
.
2. For the time being, India will remain a peripheral
concern for U.S. foreign policy. India continues to
be considered half as important as China, receiving
minimal attention in U.S. strategic circles
eventhough it is an established regional power and a
potential great power.
3. India's economic reforms will continue but New
Delhi's successes will be overshadowed by the rapid
growth of other, more dynamic Asian economies (i.e.
China, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea)
.
4. The Indian Navy will continue to be the Indian
Ocean's dominant indigenous maritime power well into
the foreseeable future. Its formidable power
projection capabilities are likely to grow in
proportion to the Indian economy (i.e. the percentage




5. The issue of Kashmir will continue to be a politi u
albatross for New Delhi in the twenty- first century.
Tensions between India and Pakistan over this
disputed territory will hamper economic cooperation
and growth throughout South Asia.
6. India's central government and democratic
institutions will continue to be tested by communal
violence and ethno- religious conflicts but will
survive
.
India is an established regional power in South Asia with
the potential to become a great power during the first half of
the twenty- first century. Although common social, political,
and economic objectives should make the United States and
India natural partners in the post-Cold War world, the
obstinate, evangelical drift of each country's foreign policy
on certain global issues, such as the counterproliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) , continues to cause mutual
dissatisfaction between the world's two largest democracies.
Sooner or later the United States will have to
acknowledge the growing international status of India. A
highly visible, pragmatic, and co-operative U.S. approach
toward India today would be the most cost effective means to
pursue the current U.S. national interests -- regional
stability, an expansion of economic trade, and the reduction
and elimination of WMD -- in South Asia tomorrow.
In addition to the current U.S. national interests with
regard to South Asia, a healthy, enduring relationship with
India could also be useful as a continental and maritime Asian
counter-balance against a potentially belligerent Russia,
China, or Japan. While neither Russia, China, or Japan are
147
likely to pursue a military conquest of Asia, Murphy's law
dictates that the United States at least consider in-
strategic possibilities for the twenty- first century's worst
case scenarios.
148
APPENDIX A. DISPUTED 30PXERS BETWEEN INDIA AND -- - \t a
-^SINKIANC








Map 1. AKSAI CHIN, TAWANG TRACT, AND INDIA IN
1961-1962.
Steven A. Hoffman, India and the China Crisis
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APPENDIX D. KEY EVENTS IN INDIA'S NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
NO HISTORY OF POWERFUL ARYAN/HINDU NAVIES: India failed to
appreciate the strategic importance of naval power; indigenous
rulers concentrated on continental warfare only.
149 8 VASCO DA GAMA AND FLEET OF PORTUGUESE MEN OF WAR LAND at
Calicut, Western India. There was no indigenous sea going
force to oppose them.
16 8 BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY ESTABLISHES A FOOTHOLD on
Indian subcontinent. The British Crown later assumes control
and' establishes India as the hub of its overseas holdings.
19 3 2 FIRST INDIAN OFFICER COMMISSIONED IN ROYAL INDIAN NAVY.
1947 INDEPENDENT INDIA INHERITS VESTIGES OF ROYAL INDIAN NAVY,
BUT FORCED TO SPLIT ASSETS WITH PAKISTAN. Both Navies are
managed and run by the British Admiralty.
19 57 INDIAN NAVY ACQUIRES HMS HERCULES. After four years of
modernization and training India's first aircraft carrier
commissioned INS VIKRANT.
1962 SINO- INDIAN WAR: India humiliated by Red Chinese forces
in border conflict. This forced modernization of India's
military forces, but the Navy was given the lowest priority.
19 6 5 INDO-PAK WAR OVER KASHMIR: Indian Navy caught
unprepared; Pak units raid several Indian ports. Following
the conflict the Indian Navy received a larger share of the
overall defense budget, but still significantly less than her
sister services.
1971 INDO-PAK WAR OVER BANGLADESH: Indian Navy successfully
blockades East Pakistan while Naval Air and surface assets hit
targets in West Pakistan. Indian sea control over Pakistan
key factor in quick Indian victory.
1971 NIXON SENDS USS ENTERPRISE BATTLE GROUP TO BAY OF BENGAL:
U.S. policy tilts towards Pakistan, while lessons of sea power
and sea control reenforced.
19 86 INDIAN NAVY ACQUIRES HMS HERMES AND COMMISSIONS IT INS
VIRAAT: India now has its second aircraft carrier, the former
flagship of the British during the war for the Faulklands
Islands.
19 87 INDIAN NAVY ACQUIRES 2 WEST GERMAN TYPE 2 09 DIESEL SUBS.
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(APPENDIX D. CONTINUED)
19 8 8 INDIAN NAVY LEASES SOVIET CHARLIE CLASS SSN, renamed INS
CHAKRA. Sub returned to Soviets in 1991.
19 9 INS ANDAMAN, A SOVIET BUILT PETYA CLASS FRIGATE, FLOODED
AND SANK off the eastern coast of India, demonstrating that
India's Soviet built fleet was aging and in need of repair and
or replacement
.
1991 U.S. LED ALLIED COALITION DEFEATS IRAQ; sea control in
the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf proved vital to allied
effort
.
1992 INDIAN NAVY COMMISSIONS FIRST INDIGENOUSLY BUILT DIESEL
SUB, INS SHALKI.
1992-1994 INDIAN NAVY CONDUCTS JOINT EXERCISES WITH OTHER
NAVIES
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Fast Attack Craft 4 (4)
(missile)































Surface combatants 61(5) 17(12)
aircraft carriers 2 (2)
amphibs 17 (1)




source: Richard Sharpe, ed. , Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-1994
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APPENDIX F. INDIAN NAVAL AIR ASSETS







































Fixed Wing Aircraft 107
helicopters 63
* (Indian version of Aerospatiale Alouette. Production expected
in 1994 . )
sources : Asia-Pacific Defense Review 1994 Reference Edition
and Richard Sharpe, ed. , Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-1994 .
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APPENDIX G. FORECASTS OF THE INDIAN ECONOMY
Table 1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES. 1950-2010
On billions of 1986 U.S. dollars)*
m}>
Nanon 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
United Scales 1378 1907 2767 3649 4682 6072 7859
Soviet Union 492 855 1411 1935 2088 2455 2873
Japan 189° 336 936 1476 2 1 27 2856 3714
Ciina" 114 232 417 793 1520 2395 3791
West Germany 172 402 622 815 1009 1244 1525
United Kingdom 251. 349 463 560 670 807 949
prince 172 282 486 695 843 1109 1410
I India 152 202 294 408 598 897 1330
South Korea" 18 27 67 147 274 455 709
Taiwan 5 11 25 57 103 180 317
Brazil 34 65 117 272 353 571 939
Argentina 38 51 78 106 107 119 133
Turkev" 32 59 104 171 256 367 501
Mewco 58 104 203 378 444 543 679
Egypt 16 31 49 98 132 158 190
'Converted from local currencies using purchasing -power panaes of 1980.
b
Japanese GNP estimate for 1953.
cGross domesuc product.
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